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ABSTRACT 
 
During the period 1946 – 1996, the Royal Air Force procured three 
separate and distinct generations of Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). The first was 
the Avro Shackleton, which was introduced in three variants, MR1, MR2 and 
MR3 during the period 1951 to 1956. These aircraft continued in service until 
replaced by the Hawker Siddeley Nimrod MR1 from 1969, a design that was 
updated to MR2 specification in 1979. The final procurement cycle was for a 
Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft (RMPA), which saw the ordering of the 
British Aerospace Nimrod 2000 in 1996. The selection of these aircraft was 
governed by the prevailing political imperatives of the times, combined with the 
efforts of the aerospace industry to promote their products, and the need for the 
government to balance the needs of Defence, the Treasury, and the international 
diplomatic environment with that of domestic voters. This thesis examines the 
three procurements to build a picture of how, during a period of British political 
and economic decline, RAF procurements moved from being a military-led 
exercise, to one where, as the Cold War progressed, political and industrial 
considerations both at home and abroad took precedence. 
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Chapter One 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As an island nation Britain has a long held requirement to protect both her 
shores and the large volume of trade that uses the sea lines of communication in 
order to provide the United Kingdom with the essential flow of materials to sustain 
the economy. The Battle of the Atlantic during the Second World War highlighted 
both how dependant Britain was on imported foodstuffs and materials, and also 
how vulnerable the convoys were to enemy attack.1 The destructive power of the 
submarine was central to this threat, and thus advanced long range aircraft were 
developed throughout the war in order to combat the German U-Boats.2 This threat 
from Germany was replaced by the threat of the Soviet Union from the late 1940s 
onwards, and therefore there was a requirement to continue the development of 
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA). This type of aircraft had to be capable of long 
endurance operations over the sea, primarily the Atlantic Ocean, in order to provide 
protection for both merchant convoys and Royal Navy fleets. The aircraft thus had 
to be capable of engaging both shipping and submarines, with Anti-Submarine 
Warfare (ASW) being the primary role. Alongside an offensive capability, MPA 
were required to provide long range Search and Rescue, border protection and law 
enforcement roles in many air forces and navies around the world. Within the 
                                                 
1 TNA AIR 15/931, Air Defence of North Atlantic Convoys Against Submarines, Research Branch, Coastal 
Command, No.394, Jun 1952 
2 Terraine, J., The Right of the Line; The Royal Air Force in the European War 1939-1945 (Wordsworth, 
Ware, 1985) p.453 
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United Kingdom, MPA have traditionally fallen under the command of the Royal Air 
Force, whilst receiving the majority of their daily tasks from the Royal Navy.3 
Since the Second World War, Britain has had three primary MPA 
procurements during the period 1946-1996, resulting in the Avro Shackleton, the 
Hawker-Siddeley Nimrod and the BAe Nimrod 2000. Throughout the fifty year 
period under examination, the strategic requirements for these aircraft shifted. The 
British defence and aerospace industries also evolved through the period, from 
multiple manufacturers dominating the foreign and domestic markets at the end of 
the 1940s, to there being only a handful of companies who were struggling to 
survive by the end of the Cold War.4 Britain’s standing within the world diminished 
throughout the second half of the Twentieth Century, with the retreat from Empire 
and the emergence of the superpower stand-off between the United States of 
America and the Soviet Union.5 This new climate resulted in the continuation of the 
wartime alliance between Britain and America, and consequently the increased 
likelihood of Britain purchasing American military equipment. At the same time 
Britain was becoming financially more reliant on America as the domestic economy 
struggled with falling industrial output and shifting markets.6 As a result the defence 
budget came under pressure at various stages throughout the period to the extent 
to which procurement was not simply a matter of selecting the most tactically 
                                                 
3 TNA AIR 2/17197, Loose Minute from D. of Ops to DGSR (A), The Interim Shackleton Replacement, 6 
Mar 1964 and TNA AIR 2/17199, Interim Shackleton Replacement  (ASR 381) – Policy, Loose Minute from 
D. Air Plans to D. of Ops, Flying Task of the LRME Squadron of Coastal Command, 4 Aug 1964 
4 Hayward, K. ‘Industrial Perspectives on Air Power’ in Gray, P. (ed.) British Air Power (HMSO, London, 
2003) p.191 
5 Ferguson, N., Empire; How Britain made the modern world (Penguin, London, 2004) pp.358-361 
6 Moggridge, D., The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Volume 24; The Transition to Peace 
(MacMillan, London, 1979) p.405 and Cairncross, A., The British Economy Since 1945; Economic Policy and 
Performance, 1945-1995 (Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, 1995) p.296 
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capable item of hardware, as greater consideration had to be given to both global 
political issues, and to the domestic employment picture. 
 
The Literature 
The specific question of MPA procurement is seldom visited by authors, with 
the exception of those who are writing the history of a particular type of aircraft. 
These works are typified by Ashworth’s book, Avro’s Maritime Heavyweight: The 
Shackleton.7 Whilst these works give a thorough background on the development 
and operational use of the aircraft, they do not go into any detail on the reasoning 
behind the procurements and why each model was selected. Typically these texts 
do not utilise the wide range of primary sources and government papers that are 
available. The market for aircraft histories are lay readers who wish to garner a 
broad understanding of how the particular aircraft was employed in military service, 
rather than an academic audience who may use them as a basis for research. 
More detailed analysis of the procurement process is covered by journalists 
who were either writing at the time, or producing a retrospective piece on events. 
As the relationship between the press and both the military and government has 
developed, so the amount of coverage given has increased. With the MoD viewing 
the media as a means of aiding recruitment and defence exports, there was a 
desire for the correct version of events to be passed to the media in order to avoid 
                                                 
7 Ashworth, C., Avro’s Maritime Heavyweight: The Shackleton (Aston, Bourne End, 1990) similar works exist 
for the Nimrod and tend to cover both MR1 and MR2, along with Nimrod 2000 in each volume. An example 
of this being Evans, A., The Nimrod: Mighty Hunter (Dalrymple & Verdun, Stamford, 2007) 
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politically damaging inaccurate coverage.8 In 1964 The Daily Telegraph revealed 
that the proposed British built VC-10 MPA would cost three times that of the 
European twin engined Atlantic which was under consideration for the RAF, thus 
making the VC-10 potentially unaffordable.9 This information is corroborated in the 
government files and demonstrates that articles in the press were both well 
informed and accurate, and also that the wider pressures facing defence 
procurement at that time were being assessed within the media.10 This trend 
became more marked during the 1990s as specialist publications such as Flight 
International and Jane’s Defence Weekly evaluated the merits of the competing 
bids for the Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft (RMPA) on the basis of how they 
were contributing to the British economy and the sustainment of British jobs.11 As 
contemporary works, these articles considered the specific hurdles facing each 
company, such as Dassault’s lack of a British corporate partner,12 in order to 
establish the what, rather than the why, and as such only provide an insight into the 
mechanics of procurement, rather than evaluating the driving forces behind them. 
In academic texts, discussions on defence procurement in Britain focus on both 
failed and troublesome programmes, such as TSR.2, with the aim of understanding 
                                                 
8 Taylor, P.M., War and the Media; Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War (Manchester UP, 
Manchester, 1992) pp.37-46 
9 AIR 2/17197, Daily Telegraph Air Correspondent, “RAF Wants 50 Foreign Patrol Planes”, Daily Telegraph, 
14 May 1964 
10 AIR 2/17197, Loose Minute AUS(AS) to P.S. to Minister (RAF), The Shackleton, 8 May 1964; VC-10 
costs for the period 1966-1973, £330m. Atlantic costs for the period 1966-78, £120m. 
11 For examples see Flight International Staff Writer, “GE improves CF43 bid for Nimrod 2000”, Flight 
International, 17-23 April 1996 and Bickers, C., “Briefing – Making designs on the UK’s sub chaser”, Jane’s 
Defence Weekly, 9 December 1995 
12 Tusa, F., “The Silent Competition”, Armed Forced Journal, December 1995 
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where the process had failed and warrants improving.13 As such successful cycles, 
or those without controversy, are largely ignored. Hence Nimrod MRA.4 will 
undoubtedly be subject to further studies in the future covering the period 1997-
2010, where problems updating the airframes and large cost overruns resulted in 
its dramatic cancellation in the 2010 Defence Review. Such studies at the moment 
are solely within the remit of journalists and the aircraft histories.14 
Thus whilst there are no academic works that cover the entire question of 
MPA procurement throughout the period, there are multiple works that cover the 
individual areas that affect it. Military strategy continually altered through the Cold 
War as Britain moved from conventional to nuclear focused forces. Paret’s Makers 
of Modern Strategy considered the strategic importance of nuclear armed 
submarines and the need for ASW; however, it, like many others, placed the issue 
within the broader sweep of Cold War developments and does not subject the 
question to further examination.15 The post Cold War period and the subsequent 
shift back towards conventional forces is a central theme of Gray’s Modern 
Strategy, but this does not detail how such a shift affected the MPA requirement, 
instead providing a foundation of identifying the diminished ASW threat, which 
                                                 
13 Moore, D. (ed.) Case Studies in Defence Procurement and Logistics, Volume I: From World War II to the 
Post Cold-War World (Cambridge Academic, Cambridge , 2011) pp.127-145, an examination of the TSR.2 
procurement. 
14 Blackman, T., Nimrod: Rise and Fall (Grub Street, London, 2011) and Almond, P., ‘Air Power and the 
Media: A Personal View from the Media World’ in Gray, P. (ed.) British Air Power (HMSO, London, 2003) 
p.36 – Almond considers the issue that only bad news is worthy of making the news. 
15 Paret, P., (ed.) Makers of Modern Strategy; from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Oxford UP, Oxford, 
1986) p.757, Miller, D., The Cold War: A Military History (Thomas Dunne, London, 1998) pp.117-123, 
Hennessy, P., The Secret State; Whitehall and the Cold War (Allen Lane, London, 2002) pp.13-69 and Peden, 
G.C., Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs (Cambridge UP, 
Cambridge, 2007) p.291 are examples of texts that consider the tactical application of nuclear armed 
submarines and their political role, rather than the tactical means of combating them. 
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through further research can be seen to have reduced the need for a dedicated 
airborne ASW platform.16 The works on strategy provide an understanding of the 
strategic considerations in force at the time of the procurements, but by having to 
cover such a broad range of topics and events, they cannot provide any more than 
background reading on the military in this period. 
Whilst it is not unexpected for the broad strategy texts to ignore MPA, it is 
surprising that the specialist ASW books also give little consideration to the role. 
Instead, the focus is on ship-borne strategy with MPA providing assistance, such 
as in Moore and Compton-Hall’s Submarine Warfare; Today and Tomorrow.17 
Those that do cover MPA do so at a tactical level, rather than providing an insight 
into the procurement process. Therefore these are studies that are useful for 
understanding why an MPA may be required, but not how they were acquired.18 
The decline of the British aerospace industry is cited as an example of 
British post-war economic failings in a number of works, however it is the central 
theme in very few. Hayward’s The British Aircraft Industry is the primary text, which 
lays out how the difficulties in maintaining a diverse civilian and military domestic 
aviation industry in the post-war period were unsustainable in the long term, due to 
government cuts and unrealistic expectations of export successes.19 Other studies 
such as Loadsman’s Government and the British aircraft industry 1945-1979 have 
                                                 
16 Gray, C.S., Modern Strategy (Oxford UP, Oxford, 1999) 
17 Moore, J.E., & Compton-Hall, R., Submarine Warfare; Today and Tomorrow (Joseph, London, 1986) 
pp.156-161, Hill, J.R., Anti Submarine Warfare (Ian Allan, London, 1984)  
18 Examples of this are; Daniel, D.C., Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower Strategic Stability 
(Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1986) pp.61-89 and Gerken, L., ASW versus Submarine Technology Battle 
(American Scientific Corp, Chula Vista, 1986) pp.326-346 
19 Hayward, K., The British Aircraft Industry (Manchester UP, Manchester, 1989) pp.64-98 and Hayward, K. 
‘Industrial Perspectives on Air Power’ in Gray, P. (ed.) British Air Power (HMSO, London, 2003) pp.190-192 
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remained as unpublished doctoral theses, and other dedicated texts are rare.20 The 
decline of the aviation industry surfaces in economic texts as it forms part of the 
general malaise in British industry during and after the Cold War.21 Some, such as 
Geiger’s Britain and the Economic Problem of the Cold War [1945-1955] use the 
overinvestment in the build up of military forces as a cause of this broader decline, 
in which MPA procurement is just one of many projects cited as a trigger.22 There 
are detailed facts and figures on industrial output and employment in economic 
texts. However, these focus on the failures such as TSR.2, rather than the less 
controversial procurements such as Shackleton and Nimrod.23 
The economic decline as an aspect of diminishing British political influence 
on the world stage is central to studies on the politics of the period, with the 
growing dependence on the United States a key theme. MPA procurements in the 
1960s and 1990s considered American made options, and the need for American 
military assistance in Europe featured in Wyn Rees’ Brothers in Arms: Anglo-
American defence co-operation.24 Political memoirs by politicians such as Healey 
and Jenkins cover the struggle over Concord and integration in Europe, both of 
which were key battlegrounds during the 1960s procurement processes, and do 
                                                 
20 Loadsman, G.H., Government and the British Aircraft Industry (Ph.D  dissertation, Royal Holloway, 
University of London, 2003) and Allman, S.P., The British Aircraft Industry post 1989: Threats and 
Opportunities on the Institutional Merry-Go Round (Ph.D dissertation, University of Hull, 1994) 
21 An example being; Coker, C., British Defence Policy in the 1990s; A Guide to the Defence Debate 
(Brassey’s, London, 1987) pp.25-35 
22 Geiger, T., Britain and the Economic Problem of the Cold War; the Political Economy and the Economic 
Impact of the British Defence Effort, 1945-1955 (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2004) pp.131-143, p.168 
23 Hartley, K., “The United Kingdom Military Aircraft Market” Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social 
Research, Vol.19, No.1 (May, 1967) and Mottershead, P., ‘Industrial Policy’ in Ed. Blackaby, F.T., British 
Economic Policy 1960-74 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978) pp.450-461 
24 Wyn Rees, G., ‘Brothers in Arms: Anglo-American defence co-operation’ in Gorst, A., Johnman, L., & 
Scott Lucas, W. (ed.), Post-War Britain, 1945-64, Themes and Perspectives (Pinter, London, 1989) p.205 
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mention, albeit fleetingly, the commissioning of the Nimrod MR1 programme.25 
These works are similar to other political texts covering the wider period, in that 
they are broad in both timescale and spread of examples, and the relatively 
uneventful MPA procurements do not feature prominently.26 
The question of how the changing political landscape and the economic 
struggles impacted the defence budgets is examined in a number of works. An 
example of early in the period is Cairncross’ The British Economy Since 1945 
which details the impact of rearmament and the growing defence budgets of the 
early 1950s on Britain’s efforts to recover from the decimation of the Second World 
War.27 The continual threat of devaluation in the 1960s and how this impacted 
defence procurement are covered in the Royal Historical Society’s Harold Wilson’s 
Cold War, and this serves to contextualise the aim of identifying the most cost 
effective Shackleton replacement.28 The end of the Cold War and the cuts to the 
defence budget are covered in several articles in Clarke and Sabin’s volume British 
Defence Choices for the Twenty-First Century where the possibility of cutting the 
MPA force in order to achieve the required financial saving is considered as a 
viable option.29 
                                                 
25 Healey, D., The Time of My Life (Politico’s, London, 2006) pp.250-274 and Jenkins, R.,  A Life at the 
Centre (MacMillan, London, 1991) pp.160-172 
26 Gorst, A., ‘Facing Facts? The Labour Government and defence policy, 1945-50’ in Tiratsoo, N. (ed.), The 
Attlee Years (Pinter, London, 1991) pp.190-207, Boxer, A., The Conservative Governments, 1951-1964 
(Longman, London, 1996) pp.66-67 and Tusa, F., “Buying Defence” BBC Radio 4, 27 Dec 2011 
27 Cairncross, A., The British Economy Since 1945 (Oxford, 1995) pp.99-104 
28 RHS, Harold Wilson’s Cold War; the Labour Government and East-West Politics, 1964-1970 (RHS, 
Chippenham, 2009) pp.26-34 & pp.85-87 
29 Smith, R., ‘Resources, Commitments and the Defence Industry’ pp.73-83 and Towle, P., ‘Maintaining 
Balanced Forces’ pp.98-101 in Clarke, M. & Sabin, P. (ed.), British Defence Choices for the Twenty-First 
Century (Brassey’s, London, 1993) 
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The historiography of MPA procurement is highly fragmented, and there is 
no single volume that covers the topic in any detail. Those that do focus on the 
particular aircraft are not intended as academic pieces, and as such do not provide 
much insight into the process. The more detailed general academic works only 
provide elements of the picture, and when considered in isolation they do not 
identify the driving forces of MPA selection. Therefore the existing body of literature 
is suitable only for background information when considering such a specialised 
aspect of history. 
 
Thesis Content 
Due to the fifty year timespan of the period and the specific set of 
circumstances surrounding each procurement, the most logical means of 
examination is to look at each programme individually in chronological order, 
drawing primarily on government files and contemporary sources. Whilst there are 
common themes that run through all three procurements, the impact of these 
varied dramatically at the differing times. Each of the procurements will be 
examined in relation to the influence of various political, military, industrial and 
economic factors. By assessing these key areas, the primary motivations behind 
each selection can be established. When all three procurements are considered as 
a progression throughout the period certain trends and themes begin to emerge. 
The overarching factors of a declining domestic aviation industry, combined with a 
shrinking defence budget and associated fall in required aircraft numbers are 
common to all three programmes. At the same time, the political need to forge 
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closer alliances with both the United States and Western Europe grew during the 
post-war period, and as such all contribute to both the generic procurement 
landscape, and to the MPA question in particular. The military requirement and 
government intent behind an MPA in 1996 was distinctly different from that in 1946, 
when the first post-war requirement for a maritime Lincoln aircraft was published. 
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Chapter Two 
THE COMPETITION FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF THE AVRO 
LANCASTER GR.3 AND SHORT SUNDERLAND MK.V, 1946-1954 
 
The situation in Europe in the late 1940s and the early 1950s was one of 
dramatic change, both socially and economically.30 Defence was not isolated from 
these changes and saw dramatic manpower and budget cuts, particularly in Britain, 
as the effort was made to transition from a war economy to one that would allow for 
recovery and growth. By the first anniversary of VE day the British armed forces 
numbered just 488,000.31 The Attlee government was committed to reducing the 
defence budget to £500m per year, and this was made a priority ahead of long term 
strategic planning considerations.32 One country that did not reduce their wartime 
force was the Soviet Union, as they continued to build up a large standing force.33 
The increased military posturing across Europe, and the desire to keep America 
involved in European affairs contributed to the creation of NATO in 1949.34 This 
shift to a proactive form of collective defence moved beyond the traditional nature 
of treaties and alliances by allowing signatory nations to contribute to a broader 
standing defensive requirement. By 1951 this was evident for MPA with the NATO 
aircraft requirements for the Atlantic standing at 448 aircraft; of which 100 would be 
provided by Britain, with the majority of the balance coming from the Unites States 
                                                 
30 Hennessy, P., Having it so Good; Britain in the Fifties (Allen Lane, London, 2006) pp.16-25 
31 Lord Ismay, NATO; the First Five Years 1949-1954 (NATO, Utrecht, 1955) p.4 
32 Gorst, A., ‘Facing Facts? The Labour Government and defence policy, 1945-50’ in Tiratsoo, N. (ed.) The 
Attlee Years (Pinter, London, 1991) p.191 
33 Ismay, NATO,(Utrecht, 1955) p.4 
34 Keohane, D., Labour Party Defence Policy Since 1945 (Leicester UP, London, 1993) p.19 
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of America.35  The system was such that those European countries who bordered a 
given area were expected to bear the greatest burden for its defence. Thus in the 
Mediterranean theatre the UK contribution was to be 16 aircraft from a total 
requirement of 148, yet crucially it was still a burden shared between members, 
thereby reducing the individual defence expenditures for each country.36 At a time 
when European economies were struggling to recover, despite the introduction of 
American Marshall Aid, this was an important means of maintaining a defence 
force.37 Once Marshall Aid ceased and government spending yet again came 
under even more pressure, the Chiefs of Staff failed to alter their spending targets 
to reflect this. The 1953/54 defence budget proposed by the Treasury stood at 
£1,570m, yet the Chiefs of Staff stated that they could not accept a figure of less 
than £1,645m on ‘military grounds’.38 With the rearmament programme expecting 
to cost upwards of £2,000m on equipment alone, the strategic prioritisation of 
assets based around collective defence and the immediate threat was the only way 
forward.39 This was especially important following the 1954 review of defence 
expenditure, and although the radical review did not see a cut to the maritime force, 
it set out the future direction of defence in the Cold War.40 
 Defence policy in Britain in the late 1940s was built around a three pillar 
model, comprising defence of the United Kingdom, the Middle East and sea 
                                                 
35 TNA ADM 1/23062, Requirement for Maritime Aircraft, letter from AVM Macfadyen (Air Ministry) to 
Admiral Anstice (Fifth Sea Lord) dated 21 December 1951 
36 Ibid. 
37 Howarth, T.E.B. Prospect and Reality; Great Britain 1945-1955 (Harper Collins, London, 1985) pp126-129 
38 TNA AIR 20/8714, Plan K; Defence Programme Review, Minutes of Defence Committee D.(52) 11th 
Meeting on Defence Expenditure, 5 Nov 1952 
39 TNA CAB 21/3567 NATO Meeting of Defence Ministers, 7 Sept 1951 
40 TNA AIR 2/11845 
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communications.41 This saw the defence of Western Europe and Mediterranean 
from Soviet aggression as the immediate concern, and with it the protection of the 
vital North Atlantic sea lanes. This is pertinent to the question of MPA procurement 
as it demonstrated a shift in thinking from the more expansive pre-war Empire 
model. First, the continued retreat from Empire throughout this period saw the 
emphasis placed on the Middle rather than Far East, thereby having a strategic 
effect on the traditional operating theatre of Coastal Command’s flying boats. 
Second the natural prioritisation of the defence of the United Kingdom within the 
strategy opened up the possibility of a short range maritime aircraft to deal with 
enemy activity in the coastal regions and the Channel. Finally, the explicit 
emphasis on sea communications, of which the Atlantic was clearly the focus, 
demonstrated that the lessons of the Battle of the Atlantic had been at least 
partially understood, and would play a key role in shaping the MPA procurement 
issue, as aircraft would have to be capable of operating in this harsh environment. 
This was therefore an area that would see competition between the RAF and RN 
over which service was best suited to carry out the protection of the supply convoys 
and would therefore be entitled to the greater share of that portion of the 
rearmament budget.42 As the rearmament programme accounted for fourteen 
percent of national income,43 the objectives of government, balanced against the 
desires of the military and the ambitions of Industry, would shape how the 
                                                 
41 Slessor, J. The Great Deterrent, A collection of lectures, articles, and broadcasts on the development of 
strategic policy in the nuclear age (Cassell, London, 1957) p.78 
42 As had been experienced in the Second World War, sustained convoys would be made up of the supply of 
food and raw materials for Britain and Western Europe. They would also have been needed to bring 
reinforcements from Canada and the United States should the Soviet Union invade Western Europe. 
43 Howarth, T.E.B. Prospect and Reality (London, 1985), p.158 
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procurement programme would play out, both in terms of how many aircraft could 
be bought, and also to what specification those aircraft would be fitted out to. 
The highest level economics of the country throughout the period are too 
broad and complex for detailed examination within this study, save for the areas 
that immediately impact the MPA debate. The same is also true of the finer details 
of the aircraft specifications. While, for example, there is ample evidence of 
negotiations over the positioning of the pilot’s air speed indicator in the Shackleton 
Mk.3, it is not something that has a bearing on the building up of the picture of the 
driving forces behind MPA procurement.44 There are therefore two levels of 
enquiry, firstly that of establishing a need for a capability, and secondly of what 
form that capability should take. That the Shackleton emerged as the long term 
MPA solution for the United Kingdom was not a straightforward process, and the 
issues laid out above all contributed to shaping the immediate post war 
procurement of all MPA. 
 The requirement for a VLR MPA was laid out in 1948, with the issuing of ‘OR 
200 for adaptation of the Lincoln for marine reconnaissance duties’ (Shackleton) 
and ‘OR231 for a marine reconnaissance flying boat’ (R.2/48). The Operational 
Requirements stated that the primary role for both assets was the ASW battle in 
the North Atlantic, with a secondary role being to deal with a small harassing 
enemy force in the Indian Ocean.45 Coastal Command preferred having a flying 
                                                 
44 See TNA AVIA 65/289, Aircraft Specification R5/46 issue.3 Shackleton, which lays out the negotiations 
covering the detailed specifications of the aircraft, including the positioning of instrumentations. These 
negotiations were to strike a balance between ease of production and ease of use and demonstrate the 
continual compromise involved in procuring an aircraft. 
45 TNA DSIR 23/18125  
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boat similar to the Sunderland that could fulfil both roles, thereby allowing the RAF 
to maintain a flexible presence in the Far East.46 The case for the flying boat was 
backed by a 1950 report into running costs which put the Shackleton as being 
cheaper when operating at a range of 600 nautical miles, but the R.2/48 as more 
cost effective when operating in the very long range bracket of 1000 nautical 
miles.47 Those within the Air Ministry argued that the new flying boat was not only 
essential to the RAF, but that due to its inherent flexibility it could replace the 
Shackleton in all theatres due to that aircraft’s problems of weight, requirements for 
large airfields and mobility of support crews.48 This optimism for the future of flying 
boats was to change rapidly and by 1952 a combination of financial constraints and 
shifting strategy forced the future of flying boats into question.49 Unlike the 
Shackleton the flying boat operational requirement had been made open to tender, 
and the problems of dealing with multiple bidders was a key reason for it failing as 
the primary MPA for the RAF. 
 The OR for the Sunderland replacement was issued at the same time as 
that for the marine Lincoln (Shackleton), yet while the Shackleton was in service by 
1951, the flying boat issue would continue unresolved until the mid 1950s. Initial 
proposals were put forward by Short Brothers, Saunders-Roe, and Vickers 
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Supermarine, with the Shorts and Saunders-Roe bids being the most competitive.50 
By 1949 an order had been placed with Saunders Roe for two prototype aircraft as 
the Air Ministry had assessed that the Saunders Roe proposal was the most suited 
to the military need, going so far as to state that “The Air Staff have a clear right to 
ask for the best technical solution to their requirement.”51 This defensive posture 
was a response to two problems that had arisen within the flying boat procurement 
programme. Firstly was the policy from the Minister of Supply that any future flying 
boat would have to be made by Shorts of Belfast.52 This put the Ministry of Supply 
in direct conflict with the Air Ministry, who wanted to protect both the superior 
design of the Saunders Roe R.2/48, but also the company. Their argument ran that 
whereas Shorts were capable of building both land based aircraft and flying boats, 
Saunders Roe could only manufacture flying boats, and that the company would 
fail without the contract. Such an outcome would result in a serious loss of 
expertise within the British aviation industry.53 The second issue was the financial 
constraints that were put on the RAF during the rearmament phase, with the priority 
given over to fighter and bomber forces.54 As the Shackleton was already in 
production and about to enter service in 1951, it is understandable that it formed 
the core of the building up of a suitably sized MPA force. The flying boat 
programme, which was yet to produce a working prototype, was therefore exposed 
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to a global defence strategy that was beginning to look to the Middle East rather 
than the Far East, and the deterrence policy of the V-Bomber force.55 MRAF 
Slessor, a former AOC-in-C of Coastal Command, had to be highly pragmatic in 
1951 in writing to VCAS and questioning the merits of retaining flying boats, and 
highlighting that despite the increased budgets of rearmament the drive should still 
be to spend on what was vital for defence. In this letter Slessor raised two points 
that in effect sum up the factors that killed off the development of the R.2/48; that 
the project represented a huge amount of work for what could well be only one 
squadron of five aircraft operating within the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF), and 
that; “…does our survival in the early stages or our ultimate ability to win a future 
war depend on having a big, long-range flying boat..?”56 The shifting strategic focus 
of a future war being almost solely fought in the European theatre, put the MPA 
requirement more on conventional land based aircraft rather than flying boats. So, 
by not having a Sunderland replacement either in service or at the very least in a 
highly advanced prototype stage by 1951, the flying boat was an easier target for 
strategically focused economic cuts and the short term focus prevalent in the 
period.57 Despite the benefits demonstrated by the Sunderland in both the Berlin 
Air Lift and the Korean War, the flying boat was to be phased out. RAF rearmament 
Plan K of 1953 saw the Sunderland remaining in service with two squadrons only 
until 1958.58 This process was exacerbated by the ‘do not resuscitate’ instruction 
on the Sunderland fleet, whereby no funds were to be allocated to allow for the 
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refurbishment and recovery of damaged airframes and further demonstrating the 
fact that short term financial considerations had primacy.59 
 The broad strategic MPA requirement of the period was built around an ideal 
fleet structure of short, medium, and long range aircraft. While the Shackleton and 
R.2/48 fought out the medium to long range needs of the RAF, the short range 
aircraft capability was equally troublesome, and ultimately suffered a similar fate to 
the R.2/48 programme. Plans for a short to medium range MPA to fulfil the 
requirement for defence of the United Kingdom coastline were in progress by the 
end of 1950, with a modified Vickers Varsity as the primary candidate. The Varsity 
compared favourably with the Shackleton and R.2/48 in terms of short range 
running costs,60 however financial considerations again came to the fore. The 
Varsity programme was halted, and the cheaper American Lockheed P2V5 
Neptune, which could be made available under the United States military aid 
programme, selected instead.61 It was hoped that the same operational effect could 
be achieved this way, but without the high financial outlay. As such a bid was 
placed for fifty aircraft as part of the military aid programme in 1951.62 This strategy 
demonstrates that financial considerations could even overrule the traditional 
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political objective of sustaining British employment at the cost of military 
requirements. 
 This apparent deviation from the policy of safeguarding British companies 
and their employees regardless, was however not as straightforward as it may 
appear. The government policy had not completely changed, it was just that in this 
case Vickers must have been assessed to have a suitably full order book (including 
the Varsity RAF trainer variant) that it could do without the Varsity MPA project. 
This was not the case at government owned Shorts of Belfast. By early 1951, when 
doubts began to be raised over the future of the flying boat procurement, the issue 
of what to do with the workforce at Shorts was raised at the Air Ministry: “Being fully 
conscious of the reliance placed on the R.2/48 contract to keep the technical and 
industrial labour force at Shorts I am wondering if, in the event of the contract not 
going ahead you could, in the now changed circumstances, find enough work to 
keep them usefully employed.”63 Thus by late 1952 there was a re-emergence of 
the requirement for an MPA to operate at shorter ranges than the Shackleton and 
Neptune in and around home waters.64 The cancelling of the R.2/48 project was 
clearly a blow to Shorts, and by 1955 the Seamew short range MPA project, 
originally designed for the Navy Reserve as a carrier borne aircraft, was expanded 
to include an order of thirty aircraft for the RAF.65 It was an aircraft that the RAF did 
not want, nor arguably need. Discussions went back and forth across the Air 
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Ministry as to the specification of the aircraft, as, due to the Navy wishing to pull out 
of the project entirely, the RAF would have been forced to accept naval 
specification aircraft that were not ideal for land based operations, and the 
purchase of which would place a heavy burden on the budget for 1955/56. The 
Admiralty was far more prepared to stand up to the Ministry of Supply than the Air 
Ministry, even though it meant paying for the redundancy of the workforce at 
Shorts, whereas the Air Ministry was prepared to accept an aircraft with folding 
wings, arrester gear and unsuitable mission equipment in order to avoid 
confrontation with the Ministry of Supply.66 
The lack of Treasury approval for the project to be funded from outside of 
the Defence budget finally killed off the Seamew, but it did demonstrate how the 
actual products of procurement could be driven by government policy, with military 
strategy only having an impact at the conceptual level of setting the requirement for 
an aircraft, rather than dictating the aircraft. The Seamew had been presented to 
the Navy as a replacement for their Grumman Avengers in the Naval Reserve, 
rather than as a full front line aircraft. For this role the Navy already had the Fairey 
Gannet as their fixed wing ASW platform, and was strongly advocating for this 
aircraft to take on the role as Britain’s primary MPA within the strategy of convoy 
protection in the North Atlantic.67 
 The squeeze on budgets by late 1951, coupled with the strategic focus on 
the protection of convoys in the North Atlantic led to studies being carried out into 
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the best aircraft type and delivery means for role.68 These papers were centred on 
the Shackleton Mk.2 and the Gannet, giving a comparison between two dissimilar 
sized aircraft, operating from both land and carrier borne environments, yet with a 
similar purpose within this context. Future orders for both types of aircraft would be 
affected by how each could perform within this vital theatre of operations, with the 
crux of the matter being the ‘gap’. This was the central area of the ocean that had 
been outside the range of land based MPA during the Battle of the Atlantic, and 
thus a stretch of ocean in which the U-Boats had been able to operate with relative 
freedom. The closing of the gap was seen as the vital turning point in the Battle, 
and as such great emphasis was put on having a VLR MPA that was capable of a 
range of 3000 miles.69 Despite these requirements the Shackleton Mk.1 and Mk.2 
were not capable of operating in the gap, and this gave both a cause for concern 
within the RAF, but also gave the Navy an opportunity to push the case for all 
convoy protection to be not only Naval but also carrier based.70 An RAF Coastal 
Command report into the defence of North Atlantic convoys came down, naturally, 
on the side of the Shackleton, citing that the extreme weather experienced in the 
gap made a sole reliance on carrier based aircraft too risky. It did, however, 
propose the natural compromise of land based aircraft providing coverage out to 
550 miles, with carrier aircraft taking over from that point. By stating that land 
based aircraft were the ideal, the report based all minimum force numbers on 
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Shackletons alone, thereby emphasizing the strategic need to grow the Shackleton 
force during rearmament.71 The RAF were keen to stress the vulnerability of the 
carrier in the era of new and more powerful submarines, and to use this as a key 
driving force for promoting land based MPA.72 Despite this the Gannet did offer the 
distinct advantage over the Shackleton by being a new design, with scope to be 
developed and improved, and coupled with naval plans for new larger, all weather 
carriers, suggests that there was merit in the Navy’s proposals.73 One of the 
conclusions of the report into the Shackleton and Gannet carried out by the 
Maritime Air Committee in late 1952 was that the Shackleton was more effective 
than the Gannet at range due to its greater payload and endurance, only natural for 
a larger aircraft, but that Gannet outperformed it in operations close to shore due to 
its increased manoeuvrability.74 This highlights the unsolvable issue of comparing 
the two different types of aircraft for fundamentally the same role in order to justify 
procuring more airframes. The greatest concern for the Navy was whether they 
could procure the new aircraft carriers, with the 1949 ‘Revised Restricted Fleet’ 
concept calling for two carriers and three light fleet carriers, equipped with a total of 
250 aircraft.75 The ASW fight was seen as a key component in demonstrating the 
continued relevance of the carrier, despite the successes of using carriers in the 
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Korean War as a platform for launching ground attack missions.76 The staunch 
RAF defence of the Shackleton is particularly pertinent when considered that the 
Shackleton Mk.1s and 2s did not have the range to carry out convoy protection on 
their own. The development of the Mk.2A, which would become the Shackleton 
Mk.3, was intended to close the gap, but it still begs the question as to why the 
Shackleton programme was persevered with when the early versions were clearly 
not up to the task. Not only did it see off challenges from within the RAF with the 
shorter range MPA and flying boats, but also from the Navy with their Gannet, to 
become the sole long range maritime asset in the British inventory. 
 The success of the Shackleton procurement owed as much to luck over 
timings, as it did to the suitability and effectiveness of the aircraft. The first version 
of the requirement was issued in March 1946, and it was for a particular airframe 
from one company, rather than a broader competition as seen on the R.2/48 flying 
boat. By having initial development carried out in the immediate post-war years, 
and by being the only new aircraft capable of fulfilling the role, the shortcomings of 
the aircraft were largely forgiven. The simple fact was that the maritime variant 
Lancaster GR.3s needed replacing, and the Shackleton was the only aircraft under 
development that could take over the maritime role at that time.77 One of the key 
requirements issued with OR.200 in 1946 had been that the new aircraft should 
have improved comfort and sound proofing to reduce crew fatigue, good ditching 
and floatation characteristics, and the ability to operate within the North Atlantic 
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Gap.78 Yet these same issues were still present in 1952 when A.V.Roe were 
proposing the Shackleton Mk.3.79 A company that proposed a new and improved 
variant of their own aircraft months before the original version is in full front line 
service is one that was clearly very confident of receiving more orders, despite their 
original efforts clearly not having been up to the task.80 The basis for this 
confidence is, however, hard to find. By late 1951 it was accepted within both the 
Air Ministry and the Ministry of Supply that the initial versions of the Shackleton 
were unsatisfactory, with the Ministry of Supply keen to press for a formal 
requirement and a replacement aircraft from Shorts.81 The prospect of Neptune 
aircraft from America, coupled with the continued flying boat and Varsity projects, 
suggest that the long term future of the Shackleton and the A.V.Roe contract was 
far from secure. Therefore what both saved the project and led to future orders was 
the timing of the rearmament programme, which required a build up forces to be 
achieved over a very short timeframe and within the financial limitations imposed. 
The introduction to OR.320 did not try and hide this fact, and stated that the Mk.3 
would; “…provide the cheapest and quickest interim solution.”82 
The constraint this put on procurement was that only projects that could 
display immediate results and allow for the extra funds to be spent within the 
relevant years could get the go ahead. The Maritime Air Defence Committee, 
reporting in January 1951 into the procurement options, assessed that the 
                                                 
78 AVIA 15/3900, Air Staff Requirement OR 200, Mar 1946 
79 AIR 2/12101, letter from AOC Coastal Cmd to DDOR1, AVRO 719 Shackleton Mk.3, 1 Jul 1952 
80 AIR 2/12101, letter from A.V.Roe to ACAS(OR) [AVM Pelly], 3 Jan 1951 
81 See AIR 2/12101 and AIR 2/10749 
82 AIR 2/11845, Air Staff Requirement No. O.R.320 Development of the Shackleton Mark 2 for Long Range 
Anti-Submarine Duties, 20 Mar 1953 
 - 25 - 
Shackleton was the preferable option compared to the Varsity on the grounds that 
it was over the worst of its development difficulties, while the Varsity was still an 
unproven design. Additionally the Shackleton was already rolling off the production 
line, and while increasing the capacity of the line would be a challenge, the Varsity 
would require the construction of a completely new factory, further adding to the 
delays of getting an alternative aircraft into service.83 By Spring 1952 the Bristol 
175, an MPA variant of the Britannia transport aircraft, was tabled as a rival to the 
Shackleton Mk.3. Despite the 175 proving to be a far superior design it was not 
seen as being a viable option until 1958 at the earliest – too late for the 
rearmament programme, and with no long term planning over the size and shape 
of the ASW force in place, the project could not be committed to.84 Therefore in 
terms of the actual aircraft, the Shackleton procurement saw off the competition 
because it was readily available, rather than because it was the best strategic 
solution. 
The readily available nature of the Shackleton was also key in the context of 
aircraft numbers. The 1951 requirement from NATO for the United Kingdom to 
contribute 140 MPA to European defence, with the Royal Navy requiring 120 such 
aircraft for convoy protection alone, came at a time when Coastal could put up less 
that 100 aircraft, of which a large proportion were out of date Lancaster GR.3s.85 
While the procurement of Neptunes was partly intended to bridge this shortfall in 
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numbers, the refusal of the United States in late 1952 to supply 16 Neptunes to 
replace the 16 Lancasters of the Mediterranean force, resulted in the requirement 
for an extra 34 Shackletons to both cover the Mediterranean and to increase the 
available war reserve under Plan K.86 Purchasing extra Shackletons was taken as 
the simplest option on multiple occasions, seemingly without much lobbying from 
A.V.Roe. When, in early 1953, it was deemed essential that the Lancaster GR.3s of 
the Maritime Reconnaissance School were replaced, the concept of an MPA 
variant of the Varsity was again raised, however the same issues of cost defeated 
the plan, and instead Shackleton Mk.1s were retired from the front line and moved 
to the School.87 These retirements resulted in a requirement for 13 extra 
Shackletons on the front line, which were ordered to Mk.3 specification, thereby 
improving the quality of active aircraft while at the same time giving the impression 
that a lengthy and expensive procurement cycle had been avoided.88 
The Shackleton was at the right stage of development at the right time to 
meet RAF requirements during rearmament. The continually tightening financial 
constraints were such that the preference was to see how the Shackleton 
developed, and that there was little benefit to be had in developing a long term 
replacement in a period when future tactics and equipment were unknown.89 While 
this is logical for a continuation of production on the Mk.2 variant, the Mk.3 is 
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slightly different. A.V.Roe put the design forward as an evolution of the Mk.2 by 
highlighting that it had extended range, new landing gear and greater sound 
proofing.90 Yet the Air Ministry in June 1951 considered that the Mk.3 should have 
been viewed as a completely new aircraft and rival to R.2/48 and should therefore 
be put out to tender; a situation that would not have been in A.V.Roe’s best 
interests, and may well have lead to the project being cancelled along with the 
other new designs of the time.91 The language used by A.V.Roe in correspondence 
with the Air Ministry was of the Mk.3 being an updated version, building on the 
experience gained in working on the Mk.1 and Mk.2, and utilising the existing jigs 
and tooling.92 All of this suggests a natural progression of the Shackleton from 
initial requirement through to the Mk.3, however given that other designs of MPA 
such as the Varsity and Britannia projects did not make it into service, the level of 
influence exerted by politicians, the military, and industry varied from project to 
project. 
From the moment the draft specification of O.R.200 was issued in 1946, 
A.V.Roe were unable to meet it, despite the fact that the text was written 
specifically for one of their own products. The company highlighted that there was 
a; “…necessity for giving us final requirements and that these should be as close to 
‘Lincoln’ requirements as you can get…”93 That the specification was subsequently 
changed points to the company having the upper hand in negotiations with the 
Ministry of Supply. Rather than battling to ensure that the military requirement was 
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met, the Ministry preferred to cede to A.V.Roe’s requests by altering the 
specification such that the take off distance was increased, and the range and 
payload were reduced to bring them closer to that of the Lincoln.94 By only having 
one company to work with the Ministry effectively had no choice in the matter, yet 
this contrasts sharply with the political preference for Short Brothers expressed 
over flying boats and the Shackleton Mk.2 replacement. This was done in such an 
overt manner that in an unattributed loose minute to VCAS on 25 Jun 1951, it was 
remarked that as; “…the Government owns the majority of the shares in Shorts 
[this] may have something to do with their preference for this firm.”95 The sequence 
of events of MPA procurements awarded to Shorts in this period demonstrates the 
high level of government support for the company. Even after the directive from the 
Minister of Supply, George Strauss, which stated that all RAF flying boats should 
be built by Short Brothers, the project was still ultimately cancelled. Subsequently 
the contract for the Seamew was awarded to the company, and in 1954 Bristol 
purchased a fifteen percent share of the company, on the provision that the 
Britannia would be built at Shorts.96 The Britannia at the time was still considered to 
be the best long term option for the replacement of Shackleton Mk.2s. In a 
Commons debate on 17 July 1950, the Minister of Supply was asked about the 
reasoning behind 160 redundancies at Shorts, to which he replied it was simply a 
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case of there not being enough military work for the company.97 While defence 
spending had doubled through the period 1949-1953, the strategic direction still 
had primacy over simply manufacturing aircraft to meet politically set employment 
levels.98 This demonstrates a fundamental difficulty of the rearmament period, 
where due to full employment across much of the country, an increase in military 
production would have resulted in a fall in vital commercial production, which was 
certainly the case for the Lancashire manufacturing region, of which A.V.Roe was a 
part.99 The rosy employment picture was not evenly distributed across the country 
and, in order to support a particularly struggling area, military contracts would have 
to be awarded to the region that needed them the most, rather than necessarily to 
the company who produced the best proposal. MPs would still stand up for their 
constituencies, though the effect this actually had was marginal. In a debate over 
defence orders on 23 October 1950, in response to a question over orders for 
Scottish Aviation, Mr. Leslie Hale, Labour MP for Oldham West and therefore for 
the A.V.Roe factory where the Shackleton was being made, remarked that “the firm 
of A.V.Roe, of Chadderton, is larger, better equipped and more adequately staffed 
than Scottish Aviation Ltd, and that Lancashire has more people, more brains and 
more money than Scotland.”100 This approach, while undoubtedly popular with his 
constituents, was unlikely to have won much praise from within the Ministry of 
Supply. 
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Just because the military were in favour of producing an aircraft, and the 
Treasury was in agreement over the allocation of funds, did not automatically mean 
that the project could be accelerated. An Air Council paper from late 1949 stated 
that an increase in Shackleton numbers would require a reduction in Canberra 
numbers, as they were both made at the same factory.101 At that stage the build up 
of the medium bomber force was a strategic priority, one that certainly outweighed 
the production of MPA. However by 1952, in a meeting over defence expenditure, 
Prime Minister Churchill was prepared to see a reduction in the production of 
medium bomber aircraft such as the Canberra, but as this was a cost saving 
measure it would not necessarily translate into the spare factory capacity seeing an 
increase in production rates of the other aircraft manufactured there.102 This was 
due to the issue at hand being yet again about the financial situation rather than the 
strategic one. The strategic military influence was carried out at Air Ministry level, 
and Coastal Command only had a significant say once the aircraft had been 
selected and the question was over the actual detailed specification of the airframe. 
When the R.2/48 was under consideration in 1949, D.D.Ops(M) stated that great 
care should be taken to get the design right “not forgetting Coastal Command.”103 
The involvement of Coastal Command in the specification setting was then 
hampered by the interests of industry, for whom the underlying motivation would 
always be profitability. This was despite a key campaign pledge of Churchill during 
the 1951 general election being the introduction of an ‘excess profits tax’ during the 
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rearmament programme.104 A.V.Roe were adamant that the upgrade from Mk.2 to 
Mk.2A should be as simple as possible, and that requests for extending fatigue life 
of all major components to 10,000 hours, and the fitting of modern navigation and 
homing aids were dismissed as being an unnecessary set of “new fangled 
ideas…”105 The letters that went back and forth between the Air Ministry and 
A.V.Roe were written in a friendly tone between people who were used to 
conversing with each other outside of the formal environment of the Ministry, and 
these relationships were important in facilitating the smooth running of the 
Shackleton procurement once the project had been signed off at Treasury level. 
Despite this the Company was able to shape the exact specification to what was 
achievable by them in the shortest possible timeframe, and the Air Ministry had 
little choice but to adapt the OR accordingly.106 The issue of Industry lobbying was 
therefore powerful at the lower levels in dealings with Coastal Command and the 
Air Ministry, but not necessarily that influential during the initial dealings with the 
Ministry of Supply and the Treasury. The failing of Short Brothers to secure at least 
one of their MPA bids, even when they were the explicitly preferred bidder, is 
testament to that. 
The viability of an aircraft on the export market was an important factor 
working on a financial level for both industry and the politicians. The potential 
export of Shackleton Mk.2A to South Africa occurred at the same time as the 
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aircraft was being considered by the Air Ministry. The subsequent signing of the 
export agreement and a demonstration of the aircraft to the Canadians could only 
have helped a company’s proposals, particularly at time when the international 
market was moving away from British designs towards American built aircraft, both 
in the military and civilian markets. In the case of the Canadian bid A.V.Roe were 
critical of comments made by RAF officers overseas with regard to the Shackleton, 
and wanted them stopped. The case was also put to the Air Ministry that a 
Canadian acceptance of what would have been the Mk.4 would allow the RAF to 
purchase the upgraded aircraft with lower development costs due to the production 
costs being shared between the two nations.107 The successful sale of the Mk.3 to 
South Africa and its subsequent acceptance by the RAF, compared to the failure of 
the sale of the Mk.4 to Canada and the aircraft then not being bought by the RAF, 
demonstrated the importance of export sales to the MPA force. When considered 
that of the sixteen aircraft types subsequently accepted into RAF service between 
1955 and 1964 only two were successfully exported, it could said that the emphasis 
on the export market was only a driving factor with maritime procurement, rather 
than defence as a whole.108 Industry lobbying was important in MPA procurement, 
but ultimately, as with the wishes of the military, the Treasury would have the final 
say on the aircraft that fitted the politically driven strategy. 
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Chapter Three 
THE COMPETITION FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF THE AVRO  
SHACKLETON MK.1 & 2, 1963-1966 
 
The Cold War, during the first half of the 1960s, saw a shift in defence focus 
within NATO, primarily in response to the Berlin and Cuban Missile Crises, to one 
of nuclear weapons as a first strike option against Soviet aggression.109 In Britain 
this shift was typified by the decision by the Conservative government of MacMillan 
in December 1962 to purchase submarine-launched Polaris nuclear weapons, 
thereby allowing Britain to maintain a modern independent nuclear capability in the 
deterrent era.110  British defence policy was centred on three core roles; the 
defence of Western Europe through membership of NATO, retaining a strategic 
nuclear force, and maintaining a world-wide military presence to preserve peace.111 
The world-wide commitment, commonly referred to as Britain having a presence 
‘East of Suez’, was a formidably expensive undertaking, and formed the last 
vestiges of Britain as an imperial power. The economic stagnation of the early 
1960s, coupled with the continued threat of devaluation of the Pound, led to the 
realisation that Britain could not undertake these commitments alone.112 Thus there 
was an increased level of internationalism within British policy throughout these 
                                                 
109 RHS, Harold Wilson’s Cold War; the Labour Government and East-West Politics, 1964-1970 (RHS, 
Chippenham, 2009) p.29 
110 Fisher, N., Harold MacMillan, A Biography (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1982) p.303 
111 TNA CAB 129/120, Defence White Paper, 9 Feb 1965 and TNA CAB 128/39, Cabinet meeting minutes of 
Thursday 26 November 1964 
112 Wyn Rees, G., Brothers in Arms: Anglo-American defence co-operation in Ed. Gorst, A., Johnman, L., & 
Scott Lucas, W., Post-War Britain, 1945-64, Themes and Perspectives (Pinter, London, 1989) p.205 
 - 34 - 
years as the Government was forced to look to both the United States and Europe 
for mutually beneficial co-operation. This need to win favour on both sides of the 
Atlantic can be seen, with regard to America, in the purchase of Polaris missiles 
and the subsequent aircraft and equipment orders placed with American 
companies under the Wilson administration.113 In Europe, the efforts to gain French 
support for British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) were 
seriously dented by French President De Gaulle’s veto on the subject on 14 
January 1963.114 This made the Anglo-French Concord [sic] airliner programme of 
vital importance, for although it was barely affordable, the French Fifth Republic 
saw it as a matter of international prestige, and therefore in order to keep the door 
open to EEC membership, Britain had no choice but to support the endeavour.115 
Whilst the question of co-operation with the French is common throughout the 
period, with regard to working with the Americans there were differences between 
the Conservative and Labour governments over the importance of supporting 
American foreign policy in order to retain their economic support.116 Although it was 
a Conservative decision to purchase Polaris - something that Labour claimed in 
their 1964 manifesto that they would renegotiate - it was Labour that took up the 
mantle of future trans-Atlantic integration through the increased level of military 
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equipment purchases.117 The concept of buying American aircraft had been a 
sensitive subject under MacMillan following the backlash in the press over the 
Royal Navy’s decision to replace Sea Vixen with American Phantoms rather than 
British P.1154s.118 That loss of the Royal Navy deal was estimated to have cost 
Hawker Siddeley £150m.119 Yet despite this, after the General Election there was a 
greater willingness to forgo the needs of British industry and buy equipment off the 
shelf from America, if it carried the twin benefits of diplomatic advantage and 
economic rationalisation. 
 The growing financial and technological need for interdependence between 
Britain and other nations was evident within the MPA field, as attempts were made 
with both Canada and France to establish a working arrangement that would not 
only be beneficial militarily, but also economically, and serve as a springboard for 
the domestic aviation industry.120 This was all at a time when it was accepted by 
the Ministry of Defence that world-wide, up until 1975, the submarine threat would 
predominantly come from conventional diesel powered boats,121 and that nuclear 
powered submarines were effectively undetectable.122 The concern was that there 
was a definite need for a step up in research and development into vital new ASW 
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technologies, rather than the purchase of new airframes in the short term, and the 
RAF considered that international co-operation was the best way of achieving this 
breakthrough.123 The apparent invulnerability offered by nuclear submarines was a 
major consideration in the British decision to transfer the delivery of nuclear 
weapons from the RAF’s V-Force to the Navy’s submarines, and this belief resulted 
in MPA procurement not focusing on the issue of protecting the deterrent during the 
1960s.124 This difficultly of detecting nuclear submarines gave the Polaris fleet the 
ability to evade surprise attacks, offer a second strike capability, and gain flexibility 
of positioning of the delivery vehicle outside of Britain.125 The matter of replacing 
the ageing Shackleton force instead rested on the key areas outlined above, 
namely whether an aircraft could be procured that was not only economically 
viable, but was also a technological leap forward. In order to achieve this economic 
value both overseas and domestic offerings were considered, and ultimately the 
Labour government decided in early 1965 to purchase the British H.S.801 maritime 
Comet, designated Nimrod MR.1.126 In the light of the priorities of interdependence 
and financial prudence, the Nimrod programme is almost unique in being a British 
programme that appeared to counter the broad Labour policy of buying foreign 
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aircraft, and equally uniquely saw financial savings during production.127 The 
factors that need to be considered in understanding this decision are centred on 
why the attempts to purchase the French led NATO MPA, the Atlantic, were 
unsuccessful, and how much influence the British aviation industry and the Ministry 
of Aviation were able to exert on this process. The Nimrod was not the only British 
proposal tabled during this procurement, and as such the question arises as to 
what made it successful where so many others failed. Finally, the political 
landscape of the time was highly dynamic, and the way Britain was trying to 
integrate with the world in the post-colonial period had a bearing on every aspect of 
government policy, of which MPA procurement was but a part.128 By assessing 
these various areas the reasoning behind such an apparently unlikely procurement 
can be reached. 
 
 The need for a new MPA to replace the Shackleton came to the fore in the 
early 1960s due to the high fatigue rates experienced across the fleet, particularly 
on the older Mk.2 aircraft.129 The rapid increase in MPA tasking from the RN in 
order to fulfil the role of surveillance of the Soviet Navy, had effectively worn the 
aircraft out.130 This strategic shift saw a move away from the convoy protection 
mantra of the 1950s into one more in keeping with the new policy of deterrence, by 
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being proactive rather than reactive in nature, the demands on the fleet changed 
dramatically.131 Although a programme of reconditioning and modernisation of both 
the Mk.2 and Mk.3 was underway, this would only have extended the life of the 
Mk.2 until 1972, thus the RAF was forced into giving it an out of service date of 
1970.132 The expectation was that the Mk.3 could remain in service until the late 
1970s, therefore there was an interim requirement for a cost-effective aircraft to be 
introduced by 1969, and which could be replaced in the late 1970s, along with the 
Shackleton Mk.3s. This replacement would be a highly advanced aircraft built to 
the heavily armed and near supersonic specification laid down in AST 357.133 The 
problem of replacing the Mk.2s was identified in early 1964, and there was a need 
for this project to be quickly authorised, as in order to make it financially viable, the 
RAF had to have the bulk of the expenditure fall in the period 1966-69, as 1970-73 
would see the huge outlays on the TSR.2, HS.681 and P.1154 programmes.134 
Thus a cheap off the shelf solution would have solved both the issue of financial 
timings, and an early introduction of the type would have allowed for the final Mk.2 
modernisation phase to be cancelled, saving £15m.135 These off the shelf options 
were limited to two foreign aircraft, the American Lockheed Orion, and the French 
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led NATO Breguet Atlantic.136 Whilst the British aviation industry did propose 
conversions of the BAC VC10 and the Hawker Siddeley Trident, these aircraft were 
hampered by being too large, expensive and would take too long to enter service, 
the very things the RAF was desperate to avoid.137 Thus the decision for the 
Ministry of Defence was not one based around which aircraft would be tactically 
superior, but instead which would be politically favourable and economically 
viable.138 
The question of political favourability was not just an international issue, but 
a domestic one as well. A purchase of the Orion would simply be an import of a 
complete aircraft and associated equipment from America with no scope for having 
some of the work carried out by British industry. The Atlantic programme however, 
was a joint NATO project, and thus the engines were already sourced from Rolls-
Royce, and the propellers from de Havilland. This workload totalled six percent of 
the project. However, a British buy would have resulted in an increase to ten 
percent on foreign orders and twenty one percent on British orders.139 In February 
1964 ACAS (OR) summed up the situation by stating that “a further buy overseas 
following the Phantom is not going to be popular but might be more digestible if 
French rather than American and if it can be part of a package deal which will put 
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work into British Industry.”140 It is this factor of British industry that firmly swung the 
balance in favour of the Atlantic. 
The factor of British industry carried two main benefits. Firstly, through the 
increased work on foreign orders for the Atlantic, revenue would have been 
generated that would have assisted the balance of trade, and thereby lowering the 
perceived unit cost of the aircraft bought by the RAF. Secondly, it could be 
presented to the press as Britain partaking in a European consortium rather than 
the procurement simply being a foreign buy.141 There was also a strong belief that 
European integration could lead to further shared defence contracts and thus 
increased domestic employment.142 Although the involvement of British industry 
was seen as an excellent driver to gain political approval for the procurement, all 
such factors would ultimately come second to economic considerations. As the 
French were only prepared to see a maximum of twenty one percent of the Atlantic 
build programme transferred to Britain, it was determined that this alone was not a 
sufficient financial incentive to buy the aircraft. The political line throughout the 
summer of 1964 was the need for a ‘quid pro quo’ to come from the French.143 The 
preferred British option was a French purchase of the P.1154 supersonic VTOL 
fighter which had been turned down by the Royal Navy. With the programme 
struggling with only the RAF as a customer, a replacement buyer for the Navy’s 
aircraft was given a high priority. The main stumbling block to this was the French 
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Mirage IIIV [sic], an aircraft that fulfilled a similar role and was therefore in direct 
competition with the British design.144 There were efforts by Rolls-Royce to have 
their engine fitted to the Mirage IIIV, however these were rebutted by the French, 
who stated that the only way this could occur was if Britain purchased the fighter.145 
This is not to say that the French were completely against the concept of 
establishing a quid pro quo arrangement over the purchase of Atlantic; however, 
their proposal of a French procurement of Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles was 
turned down by the MoD as being insufficient.146 The British need for a highly 
lucrative incentive to justify an Atlantic purchase was what ultimately killed the 
project off, such that by July 1964 the Cabinet view was firmly that only a French 
purchase of P.1154 would allow the Atlantic deal to go ahead.147 Even with last 
ditch efforts to react to French interest in first the Canberra PR.9 reconnaissance 
variant, and then, as late as November 1964, with the possibility of a sale of the 
Hunter as a low level trainer as a quid pro quo for the Atlantic, all failed to convince 
the Cabinet as to the merits of the proposal.148  
These final efforts demonstrate both how keen the MoD was on obtaining 
the Atlantic, and equally how stubborn Cabinet was in refusing it. Despite the 
overarching desire to promote British involvement in Europe in an effort to reignite 
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the entry bid for the EEC, it is clear that such a move would have to come at a 
price. What is also apparent through the detailed attempts to procure Atlantic over 
the British proposals, and the ultimate result which was the British Nimrod, is that 
both the Treasury and the Ministry of Aviation held greater sway over the process 
than the Ministry of Defence. In the case of the Treasury this is understandable, 
particularly at a time of economic hardship and difficult defence procurements. The 
Atlantic purchase was seen by the MoD as a way around difficult domestic 
procurements, and given that the MoA was seen as responsible for the large scale 
cost overruns on the other aircraft projects, their influence, and that of the aircraft 
industry in general, must have been a crucial factor in Britain deciding on a brand 
new high cost, low volume, domestic aircraft – the very thing the MoD and arguably 
the Treasury were trying to avoid. 
 
Initially the MoA had proposed conversions of the VC10 and Trident as rivals 
to the Atlantic and Orion, and these were aircraft that had originally been intended 
to meet AST.357 rather than the later Atlantic based ASR.381. These proposals, 
which, as even the BAC Technical Director admitted, did not quite meet AST 
357,149 were viewed with suspicion from within the military. Air Cdre Knott (DOR2) 
remarked that, “there are signs that a body of opinion within MoA would force an 
adapted British aircraft on us at almost any price.”150 The VC10 bid was reported in 
The Daily Telegraph to cost three times that of the comparative Atlantic 
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procurement,151 demonstrating that financial concerns were in the public domain, 
even though such details would have been closely guarded.152 The financial 
pressures of the time put the Atlantic as the clear favourite, but this did not stop the 
MoA looking at the benefits to British industry over and above the actual product to 
be delivered. A letter regarding the budget for an interim aircraft sent by the 
Assistant Under-Secretary of the MoA to his opposite number in the MoD, stated 
that “This sum [£100m] would be much better spent in the British aircraft 
industry.”153 This was despite the fact that the most optimistic quote for the Trident 
programme, which was the cheapest of the British submissions, was already 
running at £342m.154 The Trident programme would therefore never be able to 
meet the tight budget requirements, and regardless of the socioeconomic benefits, 
giving the money to British Industry would be a waste for the MoD. The delays in 
gaining approval for the Atlantic were seen within the MoD as having originated 
from within the MoA. The Chief of the Air Staff remarked to the Minister for the RAF 
in June 1964 that the MoA would welcome a delay that put the decision back until 
after the summer recess,155 and the decision to refer the procurement to the 
Weapons Development Committee at the behest of the MoA further slowed the 
process and gave British industry more time to lobby for their designs.156 The 
disquiet with the actions of the other side was equally fierce on the side of the MoA 
                                                 
151 AIR 2/17197, Daily Telegraph Air Correspondent, “RAF Wants 50 Foreign Patrol Planes”, Daily 
Telegraph, 14 May 1964 
152 AIR 2/17197, Loose Minute DOR (B) to P.S. to DCAS, Anglo-French Collaboration, 14 Feb 1964 – 
estimated the unit cost of Atlantic at £1.14m, the VC-10 conversion unit cost excluding R&D was put at 
£3.5m – AIR 2/17197 Loose Minute DOR2 to S.6, Shackleton Interim Replacement, 10 Mar 1964 
153 AIR 2/17198, Letter from Bullock [MoA] to Cooper [MoD], Shackleton Replacement, 25 May 64 
154 AIR 2/17197, Loose Minute, Cooper to P.S. to Minister [RAF], The Shackleton, 8 May 1964 
155 AIR 2/17198, Loose Minute, CAS to Minister [RAF], Shackleton 2 Replacement, 24 Jun 1964 
156 AIR 2/17198, DOR2 prepared summary to [Shackleton Interim Replacement] Report, 17 Jun 1964 
 - 44 - 
and Industry. The head of Hawker Siddeley, Arnold Hall, in a meeting with the 
Permanent Under-Secretary to the MoD in July 1964 pushed the emotive case that 
unless the Government had decided “under no circumstances would they buy 
British aircraft” that he hoped the Hawker proposals would be given full 
consideration.157 Not all Industry figures were as indirect with their implications in 
their lobbying. Sir George Edwards, the Executive Director of BAC, stated in 
autumn 1964 that the Government image in the aviation industry needed a boost 
before the General Election, and that a purchase of the BAC 1-11 maritime variant 
could make it easier for the Conservatives to retain the Preston seat.158 That the 
Preston South seat swung to Labour with a small majority may or may not have 
been due to Industry lobbying, but the intent to influence political decision making 
cannot be ignored.159 
 This aggressive stance taken by the MoA on behalf of British 
Industry, is in contrast to the Ministry of Supply during the 1950s, when the Air 
Ministry and Ministry of Supply worked together rather than against each other. The 
fundamental reasoning behind this is due to the shift in both civilian and military 
aircraft procurements throughout this period as American aircraft began to 
dominate the international stage.160 The initial requirement for the Shackleton, 
issued in 1946, was for one specific aircraft design with no competition.161 Even 
with the early 1950s Shackleton Mk.3 bidding, the competition was only between 
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British firms.162 However, the ASR.381, like other RAF procurements at the time 
was not only open to foreign bidders, but in some cases, such as this, the overseas 
companies’ offerings were the preferred option. The Navy’s purchase of Phantom 
had clearly concerned the MoA and Industry, whilst the Navy had played on the 
fact that as there were a large number of aircraft projects underway for British 
industry, and therefore had hoped that the MoA would not object to a comparatively 
small foreign purchase for the Fleet Air Arm.163 Although equipping the US 
designed Phantoms with Rolls-Royce engines helped the balance of trade, there 
was still concern for the MoA that in financially tough times other procurements 
would go the same way.164 Not only was there the issue of foreign competition in 
the military market, but the civilian market was also moving heavily towards the 
United States. When in March 1965, and after the selection of the Comet MR as 
the Shackleton Mk.2 replacement, Middle East Airlines (MEA) needed to replace 
their fleet of Comets, the decision was between BAC VC10s or Boeing 707s. 
Unless BAC could offer a suitable price to buy the old Comets from MEA, the 
airline would state that the British Government had let them down, and buy their 
aircraft from Boeing.165 The issue became highly important politically to the 
Government’s export drive and thus became one where both Transport Command 
and then Coastal Command were offered the MEA Comets. In the case of 
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Transport Command it was in place of newly ordered VC10s, and this was seen as 
tactically unacceptable due to the smaller size and range of the Comets.166 For 
Coastal Command the position was slightly more flexible, as they were prepared to 
accept the reconditioned aircraft provided they did not cost more than the new build 
aircraft.167 The needs of Industry and overseas influence were intrinsically linked, 
demonstrating the significant impact that Industry could have. For Industry it was 
not only the problem of foreign competition, but also the fact that, as cuts to the 
defence budget took their toll, so the size and number of aircraft procurements also 
fell, with average production runs for military aircraft falling from 620 in 1944–1954 
to 168 in the period 1955–1964.168 The announcement by the MoA to the state 
controlled airlines and Industry in March 1963 that there would be no new large 
scale orders placed, further heightened the tension and put the emphasis on 
competing for overseas orders instead.169 From a political and military perspective 
this was reason to move away from expensive, low volume British designs, and 
instead to either ‘buy foreign’ or join with other nations in interdependence 
programmes.170 For Industry, interdependence made sense when dealing with 
fighter aircraft such as working with the French on a light strike / trainer aircraft.171 
However, with larger aircraft based around existing civilian designs such as MPA, it 
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was a means of extending the life of a design and giving the perception of value to 
the Government through it being an adaptation rather than a new costly design, but 
also as an opportunity for increased profitability as the majority of the expensive 
research and development work would have already been carried out.172 
Whilst this may explain the continual, and in the case of Nimrod successful, 
lobbying by both the MoA and Industry, the question that it throws up is why the 
relatively late Hawker Siddeley submission of HS.801 was successful where the 
other British proposals had failed. The decision not to procure the Atlantic was not 
one that could be considered in isolation. As there was an urgent requirement for a 
Shackleton Mk.2 replacement the question was not whether an aircraft was 
needed, but which one it should be. Therefore to decide against one design is 
reliant on there being another to take its place. The proposals from BAC and 
Hawker Siddeley for the VC10 and Trident had been based around the concept of 
a high specification aircraft that would last until the year 2000.173 The Comet MR 
proposal was pitched in a much smarter manner and in direct contrast to the 
previous British proposals. The starting point for the VC10 and Trident bids had 
appeared to have been one of simply reacting to an Air Staff Target and then 
submitting a bid based around that, regardless of the competition, or whether it 
would conform to budget constraints. The opening meeting between Hawker 
Siddeley and the MoD where the Comet MR was proposed saw the aircraft 
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proposed at the same price as the Atlantic - £1.5m per aircraft.174 This immediately 
put the proposal at an advantage, as the underlying theme with the Trident bid had 
been that it was the preferred aircraft from the perspective of the MoD, but the cost 
and timescale of the project ruled it out.175 By quoting a timescale and cost similar 
to the Atlantic, Hawker Siddeley was able to get attention paid to their proposal, 
even if the difficulty of delivering it to schedule and price were still to come. In this 
sense the bid represented a definite shift in the aviation industry’s approach to 
MPA procurement with the realisation that it was the Treasury that would ultimately 
have the casting vote on which aircraft programmes to proceed with. The price 
quoted did rise to £2.2m per aircraft by October 1964, however this figure was seen 
as being favourable as it was offered as a fixed price contract.176 This was highly 
unusual as the MoA were against fixed price contracts for non off the shelf projects, 
as the normal course of events was price escalation and delays due to the 
unknown nature of research and development, and a fixed price would force the 
burden of the extra costs onto the Company.177 This position was further enhanced 
through political efforts to include penalty clauses into the contract, and 
demonstrated that, unlike in earlier periods, it was the Government and the military 
that held the upper hand in the initial contract setting requirements rather than 
Industry.178 There was a small amount of interest in the HS.801 from both Canada 
and South Africa. However, Canada was predominantly turning towards the United 
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States for its aircraft whilst also integrating its defence structure, and South Africa 
was not formally in a position to purchase a replacement for their Shackletons.179 
This interest was not however because of the specific merits of the HS.801 over 
the VC10 and Trident, as it formed part of the general resurgent push to sell 
designs overseas, and was not a crucial deciding factor between the British 
offerings. Despite the continual attempts to push the design on the overseas 
market, it was never exported, and ultimately this added to the financial burden of 
the multiple large aircraft procurements that were underway in late 1964. 
 The Comet airframe was an aircraft that was in extensive RAF 
service in Transport Command. It was therefore seen as a known quantity in terms 
of its handling and servicing and would not require the same expensive new ground 
equipment as the Trident.180 The speed with which the Maritime Comet emerged as 
a viable concept – the earliest reference in the Archives is from July 1964 – to it 
being formally announced as the preferred option for replacing the Shackleton Mk.2 
in January 1965, is unusually rapid.181 What this timeframe suggests is that Hawker 
Siddeley were initially focusing on the Trident bid, as the aircraft, by being a newly 
designed airliner, offered a greater longevity of both the combined civilian and 
military production line and the associated possibility of exports sales. However, as 
the Comet proposal only surfaced after it was clear that the Government were 
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seriously considering proceeding with the Atlantic, it would suggest that the extra 
time that the MoA were stalling for was so that the aviation industry could formulate 
a direct Atlantic rival, while at the same time pushing the Trident and VC10 as 
competition, as these would have given greater benefits to Industry. Given the 
difficulties of establishing a quid pro quo over the Atlantic, the Comet was able to 
appear, in the words of AOC Coastal Command, as “the answer to the maiden’s 
prayer.”182 Hawker Siddeley were able to give the impression that the Comet was a 
better option than the Trident, whereas in reality it was never in competition with its 
stable-mate. Instead, the issue had been over where the Comet sat in relation to 
the Atlantic, and it was here that lobbying by the MoA and Industry was able to 
bear fruit. In theory, given that the costs between the Atlantic and Comet were 
broadly similar, the Comet should have been as unaffordable as the French 
offering was presented as being. However, a domestic offering would always have 
the upper hand as the initial cost of the aircraft, if spend on a British design, could 
be effectively reduced through corporation tax, employee tax, and the benefit of 
these employees spending their wages within the British economy.183 Therefore a 
British offering pitched at the same price as a foreign offering could be massaged 
to look like much better value, and therefore achieve the desired savings that would 
please the Treasury. It was this parity of costs that gave the Comet MR the edge 
over the earlier British submissions in the battle with the Breguet design, and drove 
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the procurement question back towards a British buy rather than an off the shelf 
foreign purchase. 
This logic alone would give a strong indication as to why the Comet MR was 
ordered if it had been the sole major aircraft procurement of the period. However, 
there were three other large scale projects that were cancelled in early 1965, and it 
is this complex picture that demonstrated what drove the selection of the specific 
maritime aircraft type in a period of mass British cancellations. The election of 
Labour in October 1964 marked the tipping point for the large Defence 
procurements of TSR.2, HS.681, P.1154, P.1127 and HS.801.184 Of these, TSR.2, 
HS.681 and P.1154 had been signed off by the preceding Conservative 
government and development was well underway.185 The primary issue for the 
incoming government was a need to make up to £800m of cuts due to a balance of 
payments deficit, which was threatening devaluation of the pound.186 The easiest 
way to make such a large scale cut was to cancel defence projects and the RAF 
was forced to bear the brunt of these savings. Outside of military aviation the 
Polaris, Concord and future aircraft carrier programmes were also put at risk, 
although the international nature of Polaris and Concord resulted in them being the 
most complicated to consider cancelling. As a result of this, the political demands 
had to be balanced against the economic realities and the wants of the Treasury. 
Callaghan, as Chancellor, was in a difficult position as he was a supporter of the 
policy of Britain remaining committed militarily East of Suez, yet had no choice but 
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to insist on cuts, and particularly to the TSR.2, which was central to a British 
strategy East of Suez.187 Wilson, Defence Secretary Healey and Foreign Secretary 
Gordon Walker were all considered Atlanticists, and saw the link with the United 
States as a vital part of Britain’s make up, thus the question of cancelling Polaris 
raised in the Labour manifesto was not ultimately considered. Instead, a saving 
was made by reducing the number of boats ordered from five to four.188 The 
political effect at the heart of the deterrent allowed the Chief Scientific Advisor Solly 
Zuckerman to justify the decision as “the smallest subscription we need to pay to 
achieve these political purposes.”189 The Concord project was also seen as a 
means of reducing expenditure by cancelling the prototypes and instead focusing 
on research and development, a move that had the support of the Americans who 
wanted to slow down the pace of their own supersonic airliner programme.190 This 
strategy was actively pursued by the Labour government, and was communicated 
to the French less than two weeks after the General Election.191 The French 
response was firm, and the British government were informed that any such move 
would lead to damages being sought in the International Court in The Hague for 
£200m, negating any saving that the government had hoped to achieve.192 For the 
RAF procurements the future worsened with both the Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs and the Chancellor stating in January 1965 that the continuation 
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of Concord was conditional on Defence savings being made to the military aircraft 
programmes.193 The issue was therefore ultimately over where the Government’s 
priorities truly lay, and whether a strong nuclear deterrent could outweigh 
conventional forces, which had been the Conservative line.194 By choosing 
Concord over British defence programmes the Labour government demonstrated 
that they were committed to the future of British civilian aircraft manufacture, over 
and above military production.195 
As a result of this policy direction the government had to make cuts to some 
or all of the RAF programmes. However in order to maintain the worldwide 
commitments that British strategy dictated, the costly British-built designs would 
need to be replaced by cheaper alternatives. Due to the Polaris programme and 
the ever increasing economic reliance placed on them, the United States was a 
natural source of alternative aircraft. The danger though was that France would see 
this as Britain moving away from Europe and would thus negatively impact any 
future British attempts at entry into the EEC.196 This would have theoretically made 
a purchase of the Atlantic aircraft more appealing. However, there was a third 
group that Labour had to placate, and that was the British aviation industry who 
were about to lose a large amount of work through the cuts. The P.1154 project 
had already suffered through the withdrawal of the Royal Navy, and earlier checks 
had revealed that the aircraft it was due to replace in RAF service, the Hunter 
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GR.9, was proving more durable than had been initially anticipated.197 The 
precedence set by the Naval Phantom purchase opened the door for the P.1154 to 
be replaced by a cheaper American offering, yet by having them re-engined with 
Rolls-Royce Speys, British industry would still receive some work on the project.198 
With the decision to replace TSR.2 and HS.681 with American F-111 and C130 
respectively, there was no scope for giving Industry work there to soften the blow. 
The economic rationale behind the two decisions was logical, as the TSR.2 was 
well over budget, and its enormous costs held the key to the whole cuts 
programme.199 With the purchase of the C130 alongside the extra Phantoms and 
Polaris a deal was worked out with the United States Treasury Department that 
made the F-111 procurement effectively cost neutral, thereby maximising the 
apparent saving on TSR.2 whilst still being able to project air power to the same 
level in the East of Suez strategic plan.200 Any short term capability gap due to the 
longer delivery time of the F-111 was dismissed by Zuckerman, who advised the 
Prime Minister that simply by removing scenarios from the planning, in this case a 
conflict with Indonesia, the need for a capability to cover it was instantly deleted.201 
Whilst this view may hold at a theoretical level sufficiently strongly to satisfy the 
Treasury, it was never going to work across the broader spectrum of defence and 
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the Soviet threat in Europe. What the comment does show is that financial 
considerations had primacy over military strategy, if not political ambitions, and the 
need to make economically driven cuts that maintained international political ties 
overruled all else. 
The cuts left the P.1127, and the Comet MR as the only British aircraft 
procurements to survive and to go into production. The reasoning behind the 
Comet MR surviving was not a case of its role within British strategy being so vital 
that it could not have been cancelled, as ultimately it was only planned as an 
interim aircraft and there was no question of withdrawing the Shackleton Mk.3s at 
this stage. The TSR.2, HS.681 and P.1154 had been authorised by the 
Conservative Government, thus Labour cancelling them was presented as a painful 
but necessary means of making good on the mistakes of the previous 
administration. Even the chairman of Hawker Siddeley, whose company lost out on 
the HS.681 and P.1154, reportedly put the blame on the Conservative government 
and their poor management of the projects.202 With the P.1127 and Comet MR 
having only been in development at a conceptual stage and not having been 
signed off by the Treasury under the Conservatives, Labour were able to put them 
into production as a sign that they were supporting British industry, thereby 
appeasing the third side of the triangle. 
Healey’s brief to Cabinet on 26 Jan 1965 stated that by cancelling TSR.2, 
HS.681 and P.1154, and replacing them with American alternatives, would save 
£817m over ten years. Proceeding with the Comet MR would save £28m over the 
                                                 
202 Healey, The Time of My Life (London, 2006) p.272 
 - 56 - 
same period. The limited government exposure to HS.681 and P.1154 made 
cancelling straightforward, and that the P.1127 and Comet MR would provide fresh 
work for the British aviation industry.203 Healey reiterated this point in his 
autobiography where he wrote that; “Though my initial savings depended on the 
substitution of three American aircraft for three British, I was able to provide 
valuable work for the British aircraft industry by ordering the Nimrod maritime 
reconnaissance aircraft and…the Harrier…”204 This explains why the Comet MR 
programme survived the 1965 Defence Cuts, and why it was a British design that 
was ultimately selected. The outcome was political and it is highly unlikely that the 
programme would have proceeded if it had been signed off under the Conservative 
government. The initial selection of Atlantic had already lost favour before the 
General Election. However, it would have been relatively straightforward to re-enter 
negotiations for it, particularly as appeasing the French over Concord was such a 
high priority. The pressure of Industry was therefore the paramount driving force 
behind the procurement as a whole, initially in a direct form through the lobbying 
against the Atlantic and the desire for more time to propose alternative cheaper 
British options, and then ultimately indirectly through the need for the Labour 
government to be seen to be supporting British Industry, even in a time of savage 
cuts. The shift in the procurement landscape from British-centric to open 
competition was, however, clear and the power of industry was already moving up 
from one of controlling the aircraft type and specification, and thus having influence 
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in military strategy, into a political sphere of supporting British trade in the face of 
increased foreign competition both at home and abroad. 
 - 58 - 
Chapter Four 
THE COMPETITION FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF THE BRITISH AEROSPACE 
NIMROD MR.2, 1993-1996 
 
The global landscape of the 1990s was unrecognisable to that of even five 
years earlier. The end of the Cold War brought with it a massive reduction in 
defence spending and a pronounced re-prioritisation in military thinking. The shift in 
political objectives brought about a subsequent change in military objectives, and 
thus the procurement requirements also shifted. The fall of the Soviet Union and 
subsequent collapse of the Warsaw Pact removed the direct threat to mainland 
United Kingdom and Western Europe.205 As a result British defence strategy, in line 
with the rest of NATO, shifted towards the promotion of European security and the 
integration of former Warsaw Pact countries into Europe.206 This move towards 
Britain acting more as a peacekeeper than as a potential aggressor resulted in a 
reduction in ASW capabilities through the focus on land based interventions in the 
Balkans in particular. The RAF Nimrod, following a late 1970s refit to maintain it in 
service beyond its original interim life, was now in MR2 specification and was still 
the primary long range ASW and search and rescue platform in the British 
inventory. The ASW downsizing resulted in the relocation of the Nimrod fleet to one 
base, RAF Kinloss, and the reduction in the force size to thirty aircraft.207 The 
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Nimrod also lost the ability to deliver tactical nuclear weapons.208 As part of this 
apparent peace dividend the Navy also lost all four of the Upholder class of diesel 
submarines, and a total of five frigates and destroyers due to the reduced threat 
from Russian submarines.209 Thus the entire question of whether there was need 
for a replacement for the Nimrod MR2 was up for debate. Philip Towle, writing in 
1993, stated that “If economies have to be made, the four squadrons of Nimrod 
maritime patrol aircraft might not be replaced when they become obsolete…”210 
This viewpoint was based on a supposedly diminished Russian submarine threat 
and was not shared by everyone. Ross Tieman, writing in The Times in 1996, 
stated that the threat was arguably even higher than during the later stages of the 
Cold War given that advanced Russian conventional (diesel powered) submarines 
had been; “…sold to many second-rank navies since the end of the Cold War.”211 
However, the role of the MPA was far broader than just ASW, and as ninety-two 
percent of British trade and ninety percent of British military logistics were moved 
by sea, the ability to keep the sea lanes clear was still an important aspect of 
British defence planning.212 The selection of Trident as the replacement for Polaris 
in the nuclear delivery role reaffirmed the need for an MPA to contribute to the 
protection of the independent nuclear deterrent. With the new Vanguard class 
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submarines required for Trident being launched throughout the first half of the 
1990s, the question over the need for a Nimrod replacement in this period was 
perhaps not as doubtful as some commentators argued.213 Twelve Nimrod aircraft 
were assigned as contingent forces for Military Tasks 1.1 and 2.1, Britain’s nuclear 
forces, and as such were unlikely to be swept aside.214 
The marked disadvantage of working on a period within the thirty year rule 
for official secrets is that a large portion of the evidence to support this and similar 
arguments has to be formed from the writings of journalists and defence 
commentators. Despite this, there is no reason to suggest that the internal 
government discussions on the topic would differ greatly, particularly as the 
procurement questions were widely discussed in the media, and the use of 
confidential sources became more widespread over time.215 As mentioned in the 
introduction, where earlier media reports can be compared to government files they 
are seen to accurate, and therefore form a suitable and broadly reliable source of 
research material. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that the MoD developed a 
close relationship with the media over the period, and particularly from the 1991 
Gulf War onwards, when continual round the clock media coverage came into its 
own.216 In this environment the MoD could not afford for inaccurate and damaging 
material to be circulated and thus a closer working relationship was fostered.217 
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 If there was therefore minimal doubt over the need for a replacement 
aircraft in concept, then there certainly were differing opinions on what type of 
aircraft should be procured. Of the four companies that tendered for the 
Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft (RMPA) contract issued in early 1995,218 two 
companies proposed refurbished versions of existing airframes but with modern 
mission systems; Loral with ex USN P-3s renamed Valkyrie, and BAe with Nimrod 
MR2s renamed Nimrod 2000.219 The remaining two bids were for new build aircraft, 
with Dassault offering Atlantique 3 and Lockheed Martin the Orion 2000, which in 
both cases would have had the United Kingdom as the launch customer.220 The 
BAe Nimrod 2000 was ultimately successful when the £2bn contract was finally 
announced in the House of Commons in July 1996.221  
The factors that shaped this selection were not just limited to the timeframe 
of the RMPA competition, as the Westland Affair of 1986 had an impact on the 
Nimrod replacement, as did the competitions for the C130 Hercules transport 
aircraft replacement in 1994, and the Army attack helicopter bidding in 1995. These 
three events shaped both the approach to the RMPA contract, and the political 
prioritisations involved, and are discussed below. When RMPA is considered 
alongside these other procurements it is clear that it was not simply a case of BAe 
winning the competition, but also that the other major bid from Lockheed Martin 
could be said to have failed to win the contract, irrespective of the actions of BAe. 
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Both these aspects were governed by the political needs of balancing a viable 
British defence industry against the requirements from the Treasury to make 
budget cuts, and it was a combination of these that defined the driving force behind 
the RMPA procurement. 
 
The crisis at Westland Helicopters in the mid 1980s was a crucial point in 
setting out both the British government approach to defence procurement policy 
and to the importance of the British defence industry that would be carried forward 
into the 1990s. By 1985 Westland was heavily reliant on orders from the British 
government, with the MoD as the biggest customer with total orders of £750m over 
the preceding eight years. However, there was no sign of another substantial order 
on the horizon and the company was becoming unviable as an independent 
entity.222 Thus by 1986 the Government was faced with a choice of allowing 
Westland to be bought out by the American giant Sikorsky, or by a European 
consortium of helicopter manufacturers. The European option was favoured by 
Defence Secretary Michael Heseltine, but the Department of Trade and Industry 
headed by Leon Brittan favoured the American bid.223 The Sikorsky proposal was 
for Westland to manufacture the Black Hawk for export to what was traditionally 
seen as the main export market for Westland of the Middle East and Far East.224 
Central to this proposal was that these export variants were to be fitted with Rolls 
Royce engines. The argument of access to large export markets and even a 
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potential share of the American domestic market were key components of 
Lockheed Martin’s Orion 2000 RMPA bid,225 and thus the fall out from the Westland 
Affair is highly likely to have had an effect in the consideration of the Orion 2000, as 
these promises made by Sikorsky never materialised.226 A single Black Hawk kit 
was put together by Westland, but no export models were ever produced.227 There 
were also fears, ultimately unfounded, that a Sikorsky purchase would force Britain 
to make an unnecessary purchase of Black Hawk, and that the merger would see 
the avionics and electronics aspects of the company moved to the United States.228 
It was in this climate that, following Margaret Thatcher’s endorsement of the 
Sikorsky proposal in January 1986, Heseltine resigned, seeing it as a clear attempt 
to sabotage the independent European helicopter industry which represented 
Sikorsky’s main international rival.229 The issues that the Westland Affair raised 
over broken promises for export sales and the handling of British industry and jobs 
have clear links to the central offers of the Orion 2000 bid, but there was also a 
second important outcome when considering the British government’s level of 
support for the maintenance of British Industry as a complete entity. Westland had 
been the only one of the eight Western helicopter manufacturers not having either 
American or State support.230 The Thatcher government had been keen to remain 
non-interventionist in the company, but the crisis demonstrated that without 
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protectionist government support, domestic aviation companies would struggle to 
survive, and although British Aerospace was in a relatively healthy position during 
the mid-1980s, this situation would not continue into the mid-1990s when the 
RMPA competition was underway. Whilst this was nothing new, and the decline of 
the British defence sector had been underway since the Second World War, by this 
stage the impact was more pronounced given the comparatively small number of 
companies involved. The other aspect of selecting an American company over a 
European group was how this would affect the ability of European companies to 
compete for foreign sales. Westland had been part of the European NH.90 support 
helicopter consortium, which was in direct competition with the Sikorsky Black 
Hawk. With Sikorsky taking part ownership in Westland it was able to fracture the 
NH.90 consortium and thus reduce international competition for its products.231 
Without effective European competition, Britain would have been forced to procure 
a greater proportion of equipment from the United States, affecting the balance of 
trade and putting a large number of British jobs in the defence industry at risk, 
something that politically would have been unacceptable. Thus the importance of 
securing British jobs became a cornerstone of defence procurement, along with 
ensuring that British companies were able to remain independent, viable 
alternatives, to the American defence sector. 
The principle of supporting British jobs was a key battleground throughout 
the RMPA bidding process. The Lockheed Martin promotional material was heavily 
weighted towards the securing of seven thousand jobs in the longer term, 
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achievable through the large export market for Orion.232 This approach of 
highlighting the export potential of the aircraft was a bold move given the 
experiences of the Westland-Sikorsky deal. However, the company had clearly 
understood the importance of being seen as a British consortium led by an 
American company, rather than simply being a foreign bid. The Orion 2000 was 
referred to in the press as being a Lockheed Martin proposal, which was 
understandable given that the P-3 Orion, upon which it was based, was a 
Lockheed aircraft. However, within their own press releases the aircraft was 
proposed by the United Kingdom Industrial Team (UKIT), a move designed to 
highlight the domestic nature of the bid team.233 The prominent role given to 
leading British firms such as GEC-Marconi for the mission systems was 
championed as opening the door for British work on the avionic systems in any 
future United States Navy purchase.234 However, ultimately UKIT could not promise 
that the entire project would be designed and built in Britain, and could only state 
that fifty percent of the technical content of the bid would go to British aerospace 
companies.235 Lockheed Martin thus had to rely on other aspects of the proposal 
carrying enough weight to distract from the smaller British industry involvement 
when compared to the BAe bid. This was centred on the success of their bid for the 
replacement of half the C130K Hercules fleet in 1994, won by their C130J.236 At the 
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heart of the Orion 2000 proposal were a similar set of circumstances to the C130J, 
that of a new build design that was based around a proven aircraft which was 
widely sold throughout the world, yet with increased size, power and modern 
avionics.237 The C130J had also involved British industry with Marshall’s of 
Cambridge, a key UK contributor.238 The C130J would also have provided the flight 
deck and engines for the Orion 2000, and Lockheed Martin were keen to stress the 
benefits in savings on the costs and training that having this commonality would 
bring.239 Whilst this would carry undeniable benefits, the P-3 Orion was not in 
British service, and as such the ground equipment and infrastructure would need to 
be installed to enable it to operate, so the cost savings on the pilot training side 
were partially offset by expenses on the support side.240 Lockheed Martin, in its 
previous pre-merger guise of Lockheed, had bid and successfully won the United 
States Navy P-3 Orion replacement competition with their P-7 design in October 
1988.241 This contract, for 125 aircraft at a cost of $4.9bn, had beaten Boeing’s 757 
based proposal and that from McDonnell Douglas with a variant of the MD-91.242 
The P-7 and Orion 2000 were fundamentally similar aircraft, and the success of the 
P-7 would have given Lockheed Martin confidence in the viability of a turbo-prop 
design when put in competition with a jet powered rival, such as the Boeing 757 
and then latterly with the BAe Nimrod 2000.243   
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The P-7 programme was ultimately a victim of the military drawdown at the 
end of the Cold War and its demise revealed two important aspects of direct 
relevance to both the failure of the Orion 2000 bid and to the RMPA competition as 
a whole. Firstly, at the time of cancellation, the P-7 was running at a heavy loss for 
Lockheed.244 The procurement was a fixed price contract, designed to encourage 
the company to be as efficient as possible if they wanted to be able to make a profit 
on the programme. This went against the traditional format for American 
procurements of working on a cost plus basis, which put the risk of financial 
escalation on the Government rather than on the private firm.245 The RMPA 
contract followed the fixed price model, and despite being designed to remove the 
worry of price rises for the government, the original Nimrod procurement of 1965 
had demonstrated that renegotiations due to price rises still posed a risk within a 
fixed price contract.246 Although Lockheed Martin had been working successfully to 
a fixed price contract on the C130J programme, that procurement was for an 
aircraft that had already been designed as a private venture by the company, rather 
than from scratch after the award of the contract as in the case of the P-7, and as 
would have been for Orion 2000. The second issue was that Britain was attempting 
to procure a new MPA just five years after the Americans had deemed there to be 
no immediate need to acquire a replacement for their similar vintage P-3s. So, 
rather than follow the conventional path of observing the American procurement 
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choices and following suit, the RAF was attempting to be in the vanguard, in much 
the same way as it had been with the C130J. The issue that this raised for Orion 
2000 was that, if the RAF was to lead the way in future MPA specifications, then 
the preference would undoubtedly have been to have this template as British as 
possible in order to increase British influence through worldwide sales, something 
that Lockheed Martin could not ultimately offer. The UKIT bid was not aided by 
having Lockheed Martin engaged in a legal dispute with the MoD over efforts to 
save £25m from the Merlin helicopter programme, for which Lockheed Martin were 
providing the mission systems.247 The bid of refurbished P-3s from Loral took a 
twist when Lockheed Martin bought the company in early 1996, yet retained their 
proposal in the competition, thus giving the RAF two completely differing options 
from the one company.248 Lockheed Martin were therefore covering both possible 
angles by offering both new and refurbished aircraft. However, the common theme 
for both bids was the American leadership of the consortiums, and therefore this 
was a major deciding factor in which company would win the competition. 
The Orion 2000 bid suffered from the fallout of the Westland Affair when 
considering the promises of export sales and American leadership hence, despite 
the best efforts of the promotional team, it was unable to be presented as British 
enough. These two factors were keenly stressed by BAe in their bid as they 
promoted Nimrod 2000 on the key issue of nationality.249 The issue of being a 
foreign led consortium was not on its own an insurmountable problem. However, 
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the Orion 2000 would have represented an entirely new aircraft, simulator and 
ground equipment being entered into the inventory. Thus there would have had to 
have been a greater level of investment in the British support sector to justify the 
move away from a British-built and maintained legacy platform. The difficulties 
raised with this and the Westland affair caused problems for the Lockheed Martin 
led team, yet it could also be said to have been the making of the BAe proposal. 
All the fundamental weaknesses of the Orion 2000 bid were the strengths of 
the Nimrod 2000 bid on an industrial level, but on the political level the BAe 
proposal had even greater driving force. The Westland affair had highlighted the 
importance of retaining a strong, independent British defence industry and this was 
further reinforced with the selection of an attack helicopter for the British Army in 
1995. Westland was involved with McDonnell Douglas in putting forward the AH-64 
Apache, whilst BAe was part of the European team behind the Eurocopter Tiger.250 
The Army ultimately selected the Apache, but the BAe argument was compelling. If 
the Tiger had been selected then twenty percent of the work for all the aircraft sold 
around the world would be carried out by BAe. Thus a British purchase of Tiger 
would effectively be cost neutral, and Westland would have been expected to 
receive a proportion of the work as a subcontractor.251 This promotion of work for 
Westland, such that even if a rival bid won they would still be employed, is very 
similar to that at Shorts and the MPA question in the 1950s. Both companies were 
struggling for orders and both had government interest in their survival. In the case 
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of Shorts this was far more acute as it was majority owned by the Government.252 
McDonnell Douglas, aware of the importance of heavy British involvement through 
Westland promoted the bid on the strength of its ‘Britishness’, whereas BAe, taking 
their lead from President Chirac of France, who saw the contract as a watershed of 
British involvement in Europe, pitched the Tiger on the merit of its ‘Europeaness’.253 
The award of the contract to Westland to build, under licence, the Apache as the 
WAH-64 secured British jobs, and crucially also the viability of a major British 
company. The previous year, the failed BAe proposal for the C130K replacement 
had played to a similar theme of European integration, with the Future Large 
Aircraft (FLA) proposal. 254 As an immediate replacement for the C130K, the FLA 
was unsuitable given its planned in service date of 2005, but BAe pitched to 
refurbish the existing Hercules fleet until FLA was available, and then to replace 
both the larger VC10s and C130Ks with the new aircraft.255 The stated position of 
the RAF that an early replacement of the C130K was essential, thereby ruling FLA 
out of the running, caused the Chief Executive of BAe, Dick Evans, to state at a 
press conference that the procurement “is too big a decision to be left with the RAF 
and MoD procurement Executive…if industrial planning and procurement aspects 
are not considered as a whole.”256 With the decision on both the Hercules and Lynx 
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TOW replacements going against BAe, the RMPA contract was thus of even 
greater importance to the company. 
BAe were open about their need to maintain a flow of work between the 
completion of the Saudi Arabian Tornado contract, and both the upgrade work for 
the RAF Tornado GR1s and the commencement of work on the Eurofighter 
Typhoon.257 Even the company’s own promotional material for Nimrod 2000 stated 
that, for the design team, there would be a need to maintain their competencies 
following the Eurofighter development and the future Harrier and Tornado 
replacements.258 This shortfall in work presented the possibility of BAe following 
Westland down the path of requiring either Government financial assistance or 
being subject to an international takeover should they not win the RMPA 
competition. By maximising the Britishness of the bid, BAe further increased the 
pressure on the RAF and the Government as it highlighted all that would be lost 
should BAe not survive. There had already been 100,000 jobs lost in the British 
defence industry in the first two years after the end of the Cold War,259 and the 
defence industry was assessed to support 560,000 in 1994.260 Whilst this is across 
the whole spectrum of defence, the contribution of BAe was high, with the company 
claiming that 10,000 British jobs would be directly involved in Nimrod 2000, thirty 
percent more than on Orion 2000.261 
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Thus, when considering BAe, the question is not so much about there being 
clear military need for a replacement MPA, but more that if a need could be 
generated then work could be given to BAe to ensure the survival of the company. 
This raises the issue of protectionism, with a ‘senior MoD source’, quoted in The 
Times in July 1996, just prior to the award of the RMPA contract, stating that 
“ministers were aware of the importance of promoting British defence equipment, 
although there would be no question of bending the rules in favour of British 
bids.”262 This line runs contrary to the situation with the selection of the Westland 
manufactured Merlin in a mixed support helicopter fleet with Boeing Chinooks, 
which was due, according to the Secretary of State, to the need to retain “an 
indigenous helicopter design, development and production capability.”263 In 1990 a 
RUSI study on protectionism stated that; “The diminishing number of weapons 
platform contracts [is increasing the] costs of failure to win a major development 
competition. In the longer term this is likely to lead to a diminishing number of 
platform and major systems manufacturers.”264 Therefore domestic Industry was 
not only important at the production level, but it could also have a considerable 
influence in the initial decision making process. In Jane’s Navy International in 
March 1996, and in this case citing industry sources, Charles Bickers stated that if 
Lockheed Martin or Loral were to win, then the powerful BAe lobby within Cabinet 
would get the decision overturned in BAe’s favour.265 Without access to the 
                                                 
262 Evans, M., “Far from quiet on the Western Front”, The Times, 01 July 1996 
263 National Audit Office, Major Projects Report 1996, HC 238, Session 1996-97, 15 August 1997, p.42 
264 RUSI Working Group, Whitehall Paper 6, 1992: Protectionism or Collaboration in Defence Procurement 
(RUSI, London, 1990) p79 
265 Bickers, C., “Running the race for RMPA”, Jane’s Navy International, March 1996 
 - 73 - 
government papers of the period, the conclusion must be drawn that BAe were 
able to exert a certain amount of influence on the political side of the decision-
making process. However, this could not have been completely dominant given the 
failure of BAe to win the attack helicopter and tactical air transport competitions. 
Despite this, the powerful lobbying seen during the selection of Nimrod in the 
1960s was unlikely to have abated, and indeed is more likely to have increased 
over time as the consequences of failure grew more severe for Industry. What does 
appear to have shifted is the move to a direct form of lobbying, rather than through 
the Department of Trade and Industry. Such a shift would potentially have given 
Industry greater sway as their views were not being watered down. However, they 
would have lost influence within internal Government communications due to the 
absence of an official political voice.266 
In the case of RMPA, the BAe bid of refurbished Nimrods was judged by the 
RAF and the MoD Equipment Approvals Committee to be the most cost effective of 
the submissions, even though Lockheed Martin attempted to cut the price of their 
bid by £150m in the final stages.267 The combination of a near total spend in British 
industry for the BAe bid, combined with the clear necessity for work for the 
company, along with the costs being the lowest among the bidders, made the 
Nimrod 2000 the clear winner. The short term gains of the bid must have 
outweighed the longer term benefits of the Orion 2000 in the minds of the RAF, 
Cabinet and the MoD Equipment Approvals Committee. 
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The C130J, Apache and Nimrod 2000 procurements represented the three 
major RAF equipment programmes of the 1990s. Crucially, all three competitions 
were won by the companies behind the pre-existing aircraft in their respective 
roles. Only the Apache was a completely new aircraft and design concept. 
However, there was no other way of configuring a new battlefield helicopter other 
than as a dedicated platform. The selection of C130J and Nimrod 2000 
demonstrated a pattern that had been evident with the original selection of Nimrod 
in 1965, which was of selecting an aircraft that was either a newer or slightly 
different version of the one already in service – “…the best Hercules replacement is 
another Hercules.”268 This argument gives the incumbent bidder a distinct 
advantage, and BAe played to this with Nimrod 2000, stating that after twenty-five 
years of operations, they both understood the RAF requirements, and that by 
reusing elements of the Nimrod MR2, maximum investment in the vital mission 
systems could take place.269 The incumbent was also at an advantage through the 
fact that their proposal could be pitched as an upgrade or update, rather than as a 
completely new aircraft. The Orion 2000 promotional material played heavily on the 
fact that it was the only completely new build aircraft in the competition, taking the 
approach that this would give the design an advantage over its rivals.270 In contrast, 
BAe were keen to emphasise the abilities and advantages of Nimrod MR2, and 
how these could be enhanced through new engines and mission systems without 
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the need for an expensive new design.271 BAe also stressed that extensive studies 
carried out by themselves in the 1980s concluded that there was no need to design 
a new aircraft, and that a modernisation of Nimrod MR2 was the best solution.272 
The Treasury were keen to push through cuts to the defence budget in this 
period, with the Front Line First review of 1994 aiming for £3bn of savings by 
1997,273 which had followed on from the Autumn statement of 1992 which had 
aimed for £1.3bn over three years.274 For the RAF, the cuts were primarily made in 
the aircraft already in front line service, with each fleet seeing a reduction in their 
numbers, and some, such as the Buccaneer and Phantom, being withdrawn 
altogether.275 This quest for savings had been part of the reason for moving to fixed 
price equipment programmes that included three years of in-service support in 
order to make the programmes more attractive to industry, and thus provide greater 
competition that would drive the costs down.276 In this environment, proposing an 
aircraft as an update to an existing design would appear more appealing to the 
Treasury and give the project a greater chance of success. When this position is 
combined with an aim to provide for a large number of British jobs then the 
investment becomes even more appealing. Dassault’s bid of the Atlantique 3 
suffered on both these counts. It was a new build aircraft that was not based 
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around a design that was in current British service, and the company had been 
unable to find a substantial British partner.277 Although it would have played 
strongly on the European integration front, the failures experienced by BAe over 
the other two procurements that decade demonstrated that Europe was not the 
highest priority at that time. The lack of a domestic partner was an issue in 2002 
when BAe attempted to enter the Nimrod 2000, by this stage renamed Nimrod 
MRA.4, into the United States Navy Multi Mission Aircraft (MMA) competition. BAe 
were unable to pair up with an American company in order to be competitive, and 
as a result, in October 2002, were forced to pull out of the contest, which was won 
by the Boeing P-8 Poseidon.278 The issue is therefore a question of the priorities of 
the government. Based around the selection of Nimrod 2000, the interests of British 
industry would appear to rank above British jobs. If jobs had been the government’s 
priority then the longer term export potential of the Orion 2000 would have had a 
greater lasting impact, even if the total number of jobs created or saved had been 
slightly less than that from Nimrod 2000. Equally, the cost of the Orion 2000 bid 
was ultimately slightly less than Nimrod 2000. However, that was a last minute 
change in an effort to swing the competition in favour of Orion. Lastly, the question 
is of which proposal would be the easiest one for the government to present to the 
public in a period of cutbacks. The Minister of Defence, Michael Portillo, was under 
pressure from the Chancellor Ken Clark to make even further budget cuts 
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throughout the spring and summer of 1996.279 By announcing the RMPA result 
before the summer recess, and by awarding it to a British company that would 
secure British jobs and provide taxation revenue to the Treasury, Portillo was able 
to make it much harder for the Chancellor to subsequently ask for defence cuts that 
would threaten the programme.280  
The Nimrod 2000 was not necessarily the most capable aircraft in the RMPA 
competition. However, it sat the best in terms of meeting the priorities laid out 
above. The risk when considering the aircraft is that BAe’s subsequent failing to 
meet the budgetary and design objectives, coupled with the programme’s ultimate 
demise in 2010 after it was eight years late and £800m over budget, detract from 
the driving forces of the initial competition.281 What the ultimate failure of the 
Nimrod MRA.4 does demonstrate is that BAe saw the project cost and the need to 
portray the aircraft as an upgrade by using as much of the Nimrod MR2 as 
possible, as being the focal points of the bid. The government’s efforts to continue 
with the programme throughout the majority of the delays and difficulties, support 
the argument that awarding the contract to a British lead contractor, and thereby 
enabling them to survive and compete on the world stage, was the main driving 
force behind the RMPA procurement. 
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Chapter Five 
CONCLUSION 
The differing primary driving force within each MPA procurement 
demonstrated that the environment was continually evolving. Whilst the power of 
the Treasury was ever present, and continually imposed strict financial spending 
limits, the wider considerations and influences shifted throughout the period. During 
the 1940s and 1950s the focus was on military strategy and rearmament and this 
drove the selection of the type of MPA. This is not to say that the strategy took 
primacy over all else. However, working within the defined political and budgetary 
constraints, it was considerations such as a shift in strategic focus from the Far 
East to the Atlantic that determined the demise of the flying boat as the primary 
VLR MPA. 
By the 1960s the driving force had shifted to the political sphere, with all the 
major aircraft procurements fitting in with the broader objectives of the 
administrations. Rather than the procurements being a product of military strategy, 
in this period an aircraft contract could be used as a political tool. In the case of 
MPA the selection of British-made Nimrod satisfied both the overarching economic 
consideration for budget cuts, and was used by the Labour government as a way of 
continuing to provide work and demonstrating public support for the British aviation 
industry. Due to the number of aircraft projects that were under review at the time, 
the government was able to strike a balance between the needs of British industry, 
the Americans and those of Europe. With this in mind the awarding of the MPA 
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contract could so easily have gone to the European Breguet Atlantic if that had 
been what was required to gain stability on the Concord programme. 
The transformation continued into the 1990s with the priority becoming that 
of maintaining a viable domestic defence industry. Although this had clear political 
and economic benefits, the issue of protectionism was in effect a culmination of the 
preceding forty years. The move from the 1960s towards greater foreign 
competition in defence procurements, combined with fewer orders, had reached a 
point where the award of a contract could decide the future of an entire company. 
In such a climate lobbying from Industry increased and their requirements became 
a central driving force. 
Given this increasing pattern of Industry lobbying, it would be logical to 
suggest that domestic industry was the key driving force across the period as a 
whole. British industry, and more specifically the incumbent manufacturers, were 
awarded all three procurement contracts, and all demonstrated some of the 
difficulties that faced the domestic aviation industry throughout the period. When 
the three physical aircraft that resulted from the procurements are compared, it can 
be seen that, as technology advanced, so the size of each order decreased. This 
trend can be seen in the requirement for a force size of 72 Shackletons, to be 
replaced by 38 Nimrods and then 21 Nimrod 2000 aircraft.282 This downward trend 
in fleet sizes was primarily due to three factors. Firstly, the strategic role of the MPA 
within the RAF shifted from convoy protection to broader maritime surveillance with 
                                                 
282 AIR 20/8714, Force strengths table 1953-1955, 6 Feb 1953 and TNA AIR 2/17455, letter from Treasury 
[Fensome] to MoD [Durston], HS801 Maritime Comet, 4 Jan 1966 and National Audit Office, Major Projects 
Report 1997, HC 695, Session 1997-1998, 13 May 1998, p.3 
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a war role of ASW. With this shift the need for large numbers of aircraft to provide 
continuous protection to merchant shipping lanes diminished. Secondly, the ability 
of the aircraft to use radar and acoustic equipment to search ever increasing areas 
of sea resulted in fewer aircraft being needed to achieve the same task, and as a 
result cost saving efficiencies could be achieved on the size of the fleets. Finally, 
the threat posed by the Soviet and then Russian surface and subsurface fleets 
decreased such that fewer aircraft were required to provide surveillance on their 
movements. Thus the decline in the influence of the military can partly be explained 
in the reduced size of the fleets and the diminished role they placed in British 
defence planning. The change in RAF force structure in 1969, with the 
amalgamation of Coastal, Bomber and Fighter Commands into Strike Command, 
along with the earlier creation of the Ministry of Defence in 1964, would have 
reduced RAF and maritime air power influence at government level. 
As military influence declined, so the importance of the procurements at a 
political level increased. This is a natural change during such a period. However, it 
is the rise in the influence of Industry that is most startling. Although the number of 
procurements and their size, in aircraft terms, for the RAF was falling, it was not 
simply a case of less money being spent on the procurements. Due to the rising 
levels of technology involved, the costs per unit were also increasing. Adjusted for 
inflation to 1996 prices, a Shackleton Mk.3 in 1952 cost £2m, a Nimrod Mk.1 cost 
£23m in 1964 and a Nimrod 2000 cost £95m in 1996.283 The total value of the 
                                                 
283 AIR 2/12101, letter from A.V.Roe [JARK] to DOR(A), Shackleton Mk.3, 29 Feb 1952 - details Shackleton 
Mk.3 aircraft at £125,000, AIR 2/17199, minutes of meeting, Shackleton Replacement, 27 Oct 1964 – details 
Comet MR aircraft at £2.2m, Tieman, R., “Dogfight over £2bn deal to replace Nimrods”, The Times, 10 April 
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contracts was also a factor, again adjusted to 1996 prices, the Nimrod Mk.1 cost 
£1.2bn compared to the £2bn of Nimrod 2000.284 Due to the fragmented nature of 
the Shackleton Mk.1, 2 and 3 purchases due to rearmament and attritional 
replacements, it is not possible to establish a complete cost of the contracts. 
However, based on a 1953 fleet size of 72 aircraft, the value would be 
approximately £110m in 1996 prices.285 When considered in this manner, the 
problem for domestic industry was not one of decreasing values on each order due 
to fewer aircraft being ordered, but instead the drop in the number of orders placed 
by the RAF, and particularly the reduced frequency of them.286 This increased the 
importance of the expensive orders for both the government and for Industry, as if 
a company failed to win the bid then it could be many years before another large 
contract was open for tender. 
The post-war MPA procurements occurred at a time when Britain was in 
transition, both domestically and internationally. The roles that an MPA fulfilled in 
1950 were strikingly different from those in both 1965 and 1996. As the Cold War 
progressed and then ultimately ended, these aircraft were required to carry out 
                                                                                                                                                     
1996 and National Audit Office, Major Projects Report 1997, HC 695, Session 1997-1998, 13 May 1998, p.3 
– details the cost at £95m per aircraft, this figure is derived from the total cost of the contract (£2bn) divided 
by the number of aircraft (21), the contract included the training systems and logistical support so this figure 
will be slightly higher that actual per unit cost, however no breakdown was available. 
http://safalra.com/other/historical-uk-inflation-price-conversion/ was used for inflation conversion, accessed 
06 Oct 2012 
284 AIR 2/12101, letter from A.V.Roe [JARK] to DOR(A), Shackleton Mk.3, 29 Feb 1952 and DEFE 24/67, 
loose minute from ACAS(OR) to DCDS(OR), ORC Re-Submission – Nimrod MR MK1, 27 Mar 1968 – figure 
includes the originally quoted until cost plus the R&D costs that were outside of the fixed price contract 
element. Tieman, R., “Dogfight over £2bn deal to replace Nimrods”, The Times, 10 April 1996.  
285 AIR 20/8714, Force strengths table 1953-1955, 6 Feb 1953. With a Shackleton Mk.3 quoted at £125,000 a 
mixed fleet of Mk.1,2 and 3 was likely to balance out at £100,000 per frame. 
286 The Shackleton in the MPA role had a service life of 20 years (1951-1971), the Nimrod MR was in use by 
the RAF for 41 years (1969-2010). Nimrod 2000 did not enter operational service prior to being cancelled in 
2010. 
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different tasks as British military strategy developed. This shift was partly driven by 
a changing political landscape in which Britain evolved from being a worldwide 
Imperial power to simply a European one; and from being a world political leader to 
effectively being subservient to the United States. As political influence diminished, 
so too did the ability of the country to sustain a large aviation industrial base. As 
Britain shifted its political and strategic focus towards the United States, so the 
military followed, with a growing preference to procure more advanced and cost 
effective American equipment. The traditional export markets for British military 
aircraft were following a similar trend and purchasing American aircraft. The 
domestic aviation industry in both military and civilian fields declined as American 
market penetration grew, to the extent at which it was barely able to survive by the 
end of the period. 
Falling political and industrial worldwide influence had a direct impact on the 
economic viability of the country, with a weaker aviation industry a prime example 
of this decline. The reduction in the size of the industry resulted in lower domestic 
tax revenues for the government, and also reduced balance of trade payments 
through lower exports. This weaker broad economic picture had political 
implications, as lower government incomes resulted in reductions in the defence 
budget.287 A decrease in defence spending impacted not only the strategic 
ambitions of the political and military leaders, but also reduced the ability of the 
military to procure new equipment from British suppliers. This decreasing order 
book from both home and abroad reduced the number of companies that were able 
                                                 
287 The defence budget of 1951 totalled 9.86% of GDP, this fell to 6.83% in 1964 and 3.16% by 1996. 
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to survive, leading to mergers and reduced income from taxation to the Treasury. 
Therefore the pattern throughout the period is not circular, but is instead a 
downward spiral, with MPA procurement serving as prime examples of this general 
decline. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Aircraft projects and developments mentioned in Chapter One 
 
Avro Shackleton Long range land based MPA developed in Mk.1, 2 and 
3 variants with all three accepted into RAF service as 
the replacement for the maritime version of the 
Lancaster – the GR.3. The Mk.3 was also exported to 
South Africa. It was initially referred to in government as 
the Maritime Lincoln. 
 
Bristol 175 Proposed MPA variant of the Britannia airliner that lost 
out in competition to the Avro Shackleton Mk.3 in 1953 
due to long delivery timescale and uncertain future of 
ASW force. 
 
Fairey Gannet Royal Navy ASW aircraft operated from aircraft carriers, 
considered as alternative option to heavy land based 
Shackleton as primary British ASW platform. Remained 
in Navy service until 1972. 
 
Lockheed Neptune P2V5 American MPA procured by the RAF as an interim 
aircraft whilst Shackleton fleet numbers were increased 
during rearmament. 
 
R.2/48 Flying boat designated as replacement for Short 
Sunderland in Coastal Command Service. Prototypes 
ordered from Saunders Roe but never flown, project 
cancelled in 1951. 
 
Short Seamew Single engined short range MPA ordered for RAF 
service in 1954. Cancelled in 1955 due to poor 
operational performance and budget constraints with 
three aircraft delivered. 
 
Vickers Varsity Proposed medium range MPA to operate in and around 
British coastal waters. Cancelled in 1951 due to budget 
constraints. Briefly revived in 1954 as possible training 
aircraft for Maritime School, however it was decided to 
provide Shackleton Mk.1s for the role. 
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Aircraft projects and developments mentioned in Chapter Two 
 
BAC TSR.2 British long range all weather nuclear strike aircraft. 
Programme suffered from long delays and cost 
overruns leading to project being cancelled in 1965 
Defence Review. 
 
BAC VC10 British airliner offered to the RAF as an MPA for both 
AST.357 and ASR.381. Proposals were rejected for 
both competitions on grounds of cost. 
 
Breguet Atlantic French led, NATO standard MPA developed in the early 
1960s. Was proposed as an interim RAF aircraft to 
replace the Shackleton mk.2, but never ordered due to 
political pressures. Later variants were referred to as 
the ‘Atlantique’, however British files from the period 
only refer to the aircraft as ‘Atlantic’. 
 
BAC Concord Joint British and French supersonic airliner under 
development during the mid 1960s. The original British 
spelling ‘Concord’ was ultimately replaced by the 
French spelling ‘Concorde’. British government files of 
the period refer to the aircraft as Concord. 
 
General Dynamics F-111 American twin seat fighter bomber ordered as an off the 
shelf replacement for the TSR-2 in the 1965 Defence 
Review. Due to spiralling costs and delays this 
programme was replaced by an increased order for the 
British Blackburn Buccaneer in 1968. 
 
de Havilland Sea Vixon Naval two seat interceptor, originally due to be replaced 
by P.1154, however the Royal Navy opted for Rolls 
Royce engined McDonnell Douglas Phantoms in 1964. 
 
Hawker Siddeley HS.681 Four engined transport aircraft design. It was cancelled 
in the 1965 Defence Review whilst still at the design 
stage and replaced by the American C130 Hercules. 
 
Hawker Siddeley HS.801 Internal company designation for the maritime variant of 
the Comet airliner. Also referred to the Comet MR 
(Maritime Reconnaissance) and named in RAF service 
as Nimrod MR.1 
 
Hawker Siddeley P.1127 Small single seat VTOL fighter under development for 
the RAF and Royal Navy during the early 1960s. It was 
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put into production by the incoming Labour government 
in 1965 and renamed Harrier. 
 
Hawker Siddeley P.1154 VTOL fighter intended to be produced in two variants for 
the Royal Navy and RAF, both types cancelled and 
replaced by Rolls Royce engined American McDonnell 
Douglas Phantoms. The RAF order was cancelled 
subsequent to the Naval order during the 1965 Defence 
Review. 
 
Hawker Siddeley Trident Airliner offered to the RAF as basis for Shackleton mk.2 
replacement. It was rejected on the grounds of cost and 
timescales without the manufacture of any prototypes.  
 
Lockheed C130 Hercules American transport aircraft that was procured as an off 
the shelf replacement for the Argosy and Belfast aircraft 
after their designated replacement, the HS.681, was 
cancelled in 1965. 
 
Lockheed Orion American made MPA, considered alongside Atlantic as 
a replacement for the Shackleton mk.2. Not ordered by 
the RAF. 
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Aircraft projects and developments mentioned in Chapter Three 
 
BAe FLA Future Large Aircraft, a European design, led in the UK by 
BAe for a jet powered transport aircraft to replace the RAF 
C130K and VC10 fleets. It lost the competition to the 
Lockheed C130J. The design was later modified to a 
propeller driven model as the Airbus A400M, designated 
Atlas in RAF service. 
 
BAe Nimrod 2000 British MPA proposed as a direct replacement for the Nimrod 
MR.2. It was an updated version of the Nimrod MR.2 and 
was selected as its replacement in 1996. Renamed MRA.4 in 
1998 and cancelled in 2010 Defence Review due to cost 
overruns and delays after the production of four complete 
airframes. 
 
Dassault Atlantique 3 Updated version of the Breguet Atlantic that had been 
proposed as the Shackleton mk.2 replacement. The 
Atlantique 3 was in design phase and the RAF would have 
been the launch customer had it been ordered as the 
replacement for the Nimrod MR.2 
 
Eurocopter Tiger A European consortium, including BAe, proposal for an 
attack helicopter for the British Army. It lost the competition to 
the Westland WAH-64 in 1995. 
 
Lockheed P-7 Updated and enlarged P-3 Orion that won the contract to 
replace the P-3 in US Navy service in 1988. Cancelled in 
1989 due to cost overruns and the easing of Cold War 
tensions reduced the urgency for an Orion replacement. 
 
Lockheed Martin C130J Updated Hercules design, produced in house by Lockheed 
Martin and offered as replacement for the older RAF C130K. 
A partial fleet replacement contract was awarded in 1994 for 
25 aircraft. 
 
Lockheed Martin Orion 2000 American designed aircraft proposed as a replacement for 
the Nimrod MR.2. RAF would have been the launch 
customer for the aircraft however lost the competition to 
Nimrod 2000. 
 
Loral Valkyrie American designed update to Lockheed P-3A Orion and 
proposed as a replacement for Nimrod MR.2. The proposal 
lost the competition to the Nimrod 2000 whilst at the design 
stage. 
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Westland WAH-64 Apache British built variant of the McDonnell Douglas AH-64 Apache 
attack helicopter built under licence. Was the successful 
bidder in the competition for the replacement of the Westland 
Lynx. 
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